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OREGON’S AMPHIBIOUS PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE:‡
THE OSWEGO LAKE DECISION
BY
MICHAEL C. BLUMM* & RYAN J. ROBERTS**
In late 2019, the Oregon Supreme Court decided the Oswego
Lake case, concerning public access rights to the State’s only allegedly
“private” lake, located in suburban Portland. The court’s unanimous
decision was pathbreaking for it interpreted the State’s public trust
doctrine, for the first time, to apply to uplands adjacent to navigable
waters necessary for accessing those waters. The court also clarified
that the doctrine applies to fish and wildlife, and to local
governments as well as the State, and invoked private trust principles
in articulating public trust duties. The plaintiffs achieved all these
results over the objections of the State, which has long sought a
narrow judicial interpretation of the doctrine’s public rights.
However, the court did not give the public immediate rights to access
Oswego Lake, limiting upland access rights to waterbodies that meet
the federal test for title: they must have been suitable for commercial
trade or transport at statehood in 1859. Although this test may be a
boon to historians versed in the settlement conditions of the midnineteenth century, it lacks any perceptible policy justification a
century and a half post-statehood. The court made no attempt to
explain why it restricted public access from public lands to public
waters to such an arcane and archaic test.
This Article discusses the Oswego Lake decision, explaining the
history of the lake and the persistent efforts of the Lake Oswego
Corporation to monopolize access to it. These efforts have proved to be
surprisingly successful, even though for over 100 years Oregon State
law has recognized public rights to use all waterbodies capable of
supporting recreational watercraft, which far outnumber the few
waterways that passed the federal test in 1859. The court’s decision
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means monopoly use of the lake will continue until the courts
determine evidence from the lake’s history satisfies the federal test,
likely a long and expensive process. This Article examines how the
Oswego Lake case reflected the political dynamics of local government
captured by wealthy landowners as well as the State’s antipathy for
carrying out public trust duties. Appendix A responds to a recent
comment by Dean Huffman. Appendix B sets forth an initiative
proposed by an Oregon bar section that would establish a “legal
guardian for future generations” to protect public trust rights the
State apparently cannot.
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Appendix B—A Proposal for an Office of Legal Guardian for
Future Generations ........................................................... 1286
I. INTRODUCTION
Oswego Lake, a shimmering emerald perched above the Willamette
River, is once again the focus of decades of contention between public
access and privatization. This tension between private and public
interests stems from the lake’s popularity for water-borne recreation,
boasting a surface area of 395 acres and nearly 11 miles of shoreline.1
Private ownership of most of the shoreline restricts public access to three
municipal waterfront parks and a swim park, all owned by the City of
Lake Oswego.2 The most recent conflict centers around the City of Lake
Oswego’s rules prohibiting access to the lake from four city-owned
waterfront parklands.3 In combination with private ownership over the
rest of the lakeshore, these restrictions effectively established a monopoly
for members of the Lake Oswego Corporation (Lake Corp), who enjoy
exclusive access to recreate on the lake.4
In 2012, two members of the public who wished to swim and kayak
on the lake filed suit against the City, the State of Oregon, and Lake
Corp.5 They challenged the City’s rules on the grounds the rules support
Lake Corp’s private monopoly in violation of the State’s public trust
doctrine and the Equal Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Oregon
Constitution.6 The public trust claim asserted sovereign governments like
the State of Oregon and the City of Lake Oswego must hold publicly
1 DANIEL
JOHNSON ET AL., ATLAS OF OREGON LAKES 114 (1985),
https://perma.cc/Q2DH-QP7T (last visited Oct. 17, 2020).
2 Conrad Wilson, Oregon Supreme Court Considers Lake Oswego’s Lake Access Rules,
OR. PUB. BROADCAST (May 3, 2018), https://perma.cc/8BR5-AKLB (“Despite the water being
public, the city prohibits access to the lake from adjoining public parks. Put another way:
the city’s rules don’t allow people to get into the lake from public parks that touch the lake.”).
3 Kramer v. City of Lake Oswego (Kramer II), 446 P.3d 1, 5–7 (Or. 2019); On the history
of conflicts over the lake, see infra notes 37–48 and accompanying text. See also Everton
Bailey, Jr., Locals, Critics Spar Over Access to Oregon Lake, OREGONIAN (Mar. 1, 2012),
https://perma.cc/B6GB-A4XG (quoting Doug Thomas, president of the Lake Oswego Corporation’s board of directors) (“Every 10 years or so, someone makes a challenge as to why
everyone and anyone can’t come into the lake.”).
4 See Kramer II, 446 P.3d at 6–7 (citing CITY COUNCIL, CITY OF LAKE OSWEGO, RULES
AND REGULATIONS (KNOWN AS PARK RULES) GOVERNING THE USE OF CITY OWNED PARK AND
RECREATION PROPERTY, AMENITIES AND FACILITIES, Res. 12-12 § 1(19) (Or. 2012) amended
by Res. 16-24 § 3(27) (Or. 2016)) (barring “any person to enter Oswego Lake from Millennium Plaza Park, Sundeleaf Plaza or the Headlee Walkway by any means or method”),
https://perma.cc/ET32-9LQW (last visited March 26, 2020); id. at 6 (citing CLACKAMAS
COUNTY, OR., DEED BOOK 223: 268−71 (1934) (restricting recreational use to the “resident
children of Lake Oswego”); see infra notes 93−94, 302 and accompanying text.
5 Kramer II, 446 P.3d at 5; Kramer v. City of Lake Oswego, No. 3:12–00927-HA, at *1
(D. Or. Oct. 11. 2012) (explaining that the lawsuit was a challenge to a city resolution passed
on April 3, 2012).
6 Kramer II, 446 P.3d at 19–20; OR. CONST. art. I, § 20.
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owned resources in trust, including navigable lakes like Oswego Lake.7
As trustees of these resources, the City and the State have a fiduciary
duty to protect them for the benefit of present and future generations of
the public—not the adjacent landowners.8 The plaintiffs also claimed the
doctrine imposed affirmative obligations on those sovereigns to provide
public access to, and prevent substantial impairment of, the lake.9 Their
constitutional claim asserted the rules created an impermissible
monopoly under the Oregon Constitution.10
The City defended its exclusionary rules on the ground it was within
its police powers to protect public health and safety.11 The State argued
the public trust doctrine does not apply to uplands like the City’s parks
because it extends only to submersible and submerged lands and, in any
event, imposes no affirmative obligations on the State.12 The lower courts
rejected virtually the entirety of the plaintiffs’ claims.13 But the Oregon
Supreme Court, in a unanimous, lengthy, and confounding opinion, gave
the plaintiffs much of what they sought—although not immediate access

7 See Kramer II, 446 P.3d at 5 (explaining the swim park, part of Lake Oswego, should
be protected by the common law public trust doctrine, which would require sovereign governments such as the State of Oregon and the City of Lake Oswego to hold the lake in trust).
8 Id. at 17–18, 18 n.22 (agreeing both the State and the City have trust obligations,
importing the trustee’s fiduciary duty from private trust law to reinforce public trust limitations on the State and its municipalities). But see Chernaik v. Brown, 367 Or. 143, 168
(Or. 2020) (rejecting the notion that “all” private trust principles apply to the public trust
doctrine because those principles could overburden the public trust doctrine, although not
rejecting their selective application).
9 Kramer II, 446 P.3d at 12; Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 474 (1970) (explaining
that the public trust doctrine provides a judicial remedy enabling the public to challenge a
government’s actions or inactions that deny public access to or which threaten significant
impairment of trust resources).
10 OR. CONST. art. I, § 20. See infra notes 93−94 and accompanying text.
11 Kramer II, 446 P.3d at 20 (affirming that an outright ban on public access to Oswego
Lake was not a violation of the Equal Privileges and Immunities Clause because the court
thought it did not grant a privilege to a select class of persons).
12 See Brief on the Merits of Respondent on Review, State of Oregon at 3–4, Kramer II,
446 P.3d 1 (Or. 2019) (No. S065014), 2018 WL 1240191 [hereinafter State’s Brief] (maintaining that the public trust doctrine only imposed limits on the State’s ability to convey
submersible and submerged lands).
13 See Kramer v. City of Lake Oswego (Kramer I), 395 P.3d 592, 595, 597, 612 (Or. Ct.
App. 2017) (stating that the City deemed an absolute ban necessary to forward its goals of
improving public safety and the ecological health of the lake), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 446
P.3d 1 (Or. 2019), and opinion adhered to as modified on reconsideration, 455 P.3d 922 (Or.
2019). The Oregon Court of Appeals did remand to the trial court, directing it to respond to
the plaintiffs’ request for declaratory relief. Id. at 612.
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to the lake.14 Instead, plaintiffs must await a trial to determine whether
the lake is a navigable water under the federal test for title.15
The Supreme Court’s opinion broke significant new Oregon public
trust ground by rejecting several narrow interpretations of the doctrine
propounded by the State and the City.16 With one significant exception,
the State lost on all the public trust doctrine interpretations it
advanced.17 For example, over the State’s objections, the court expanded
the scope of the public trust doctrine to a waterway’s adjacent public
uplands,18 included fish and wildlife within the trust,19 and invoked
private trust principles in articulating the State’s affirmative duties,
which the State had denied.20 The court also rejected the City’s claim it
14 Kramer II, 446 P.3d at 6. The Oregon Supreme Court reversed the lower courts on the
public trust doctrine claim because they failed to adequately analyze the relationship between the State and its municipalities under the limits the doctrine imposes. Id. at 18–19.
The court construed the doctrine to afford the public a right of access to public waterways
from public uplands if the waterways are title-navigable. Id. at 25–26.
15 See discussion infra Part IV.A; infra notes 107−108 and accompanying text.
16 Kramer II, 446 P.3d at 17–18, 25–26.
17 Id. at 11 (explaining that the plaintiffs’ argument that the public use doctrine compels
abutting land owners to allow incidental uses of the banks of waterways was overbroad
because Oregon case law recognized only a narrow exception to the “general rule that those
engaged in use of the water highways are prohibited from interfering with the land at all”
which occurs when “first, the burden on the landowner [i]s incidental and temporary; and
second, without imposing that incidental burden on the landowner, the navigator c[an] not
continue [using the water highway]”).
18 Id. at 16–17 (reviewing the public trust doctrine’s application to public uplands in
three other states: Iowa, Montana, and New Jersey); see discussion infra Part IV.A; infra
note 109 and accompanying text.
19 The State argued to the court of appeals that the public trust doctrine applies only to
title-navigable waters. Kramer I, 395 P.3d 592, 602 (Or. Ct. App. 2017) (footnote omitted).
The State reasserted this position in its brief to the Oregon Supreme Court, stating that no
Oregon court has applied the public trust beyond 1) limiting the State from alienating beds
of title-navigable waterways, and 2) establishing the contours of the State’s authority to
regulate activities in such waterways. State’s Brief, supra note 12, at 9–10. These assertions
are inconsistent with the State’s position in a contemporaneous suit against Monsanto Company et al., where the State asserted public trust ownership over “all natural resources
within its borders, which it holds and protects for the benefit of all Oregonians.” Complaint
¶ 9, State of Oregon v. Monsanto Co., et al., Multnomah County Circuit Court, No.
18CV00540 (Jan. 4, 2018) [hereinafter Monsanto Complaint]. See also infra note 82, and
accompanying text. In Kramer II, the Oregon Supreme Court not only rejected the State’s
interpretation, but also recognized that the scope of the public trust doctrine extends to fish
and wildlife. Kramer II, 446 P.3d at 12 n.12 (“Water is not the only resources that the State
holds in trust.” (citations omitted)). See also State v. Dickerson, 345 P.3d 447, 454–55 (Or.
2015) (en banc) (explaining that wildlife is a trust resource); Portland Fish Co. v. Benson,
108 P. 122, 124 (Or. 1910) (stressing the State holds fish in trust prior to capture); see infra
note 82 and accompanying text. But see Chernaik, 367 Or. 143, 164 (Or. 2020) (distinguishing other resources under other trust doctrines, which may not impose affirmative obligations on the State).
20 Kramer II, 446 P.3d at 15–16 (discussing two prior decisions related to the rights of
private owners as “suggest[ing] that the rights flowing from ownership of submersible lands
includes a right to pass from the upland border of that land to the adjacent water”). Like
the lower courts, the Oregon Supreme Court also rejected plaintiffs’ constitutional claim
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had no public trust obligations.21 But the court restricted the scope of the
public trust doctrine to waterways meeting the federal title test, under
reasoning that is hard to understand.22 The result, while disappointing to
the plaintiffs23—who must endure more delays and marshal century-anda-half-old evidence which may not exist24—promises to invigorate the
State’s venerable public trust doctrine in the future.
This Article examines the Oregon Supreme Court’s Kramer v. City of
Lake Oswego25 decision and its ramifications for the public trust doctrine
in Oregon. Part I explains the monopoly of lake access the City endorsed
in its rules that prompted the suit. Part II briefly discusses the lower
court decisions, where the Oregon circuit court summarily rejected the
plaintiff’s claims, and the Oregon Court of Appeals affirmation. Part III
examines the Oregon Supreme Court’s Oswego Lake decision, where the
plaintiffs succeeded in many of their arguments: applying the public trust
doctrine to uplands, fish, and wildlife and confirming the State’s
affirmative trust obligations and the City’s duty to implement those
obligations.26 Part IV turns to issues the circuit court must address on
remand, beginning with an explanation of the chain of title to some of the
properties surrounding Oswego Lake. The title chains appear to show the
State, not Lake Corp, owns the lakebed of Oswego Lake. Part V then
explores the specific issues the plaintiffs must address to show the public
trust doctrine applies to Oswego Lake under the Supreme Court’s new
test. If they succeed, the public will have a right to access Oswego Lake
from the surrounding public parklands, as the plaintiffs have asserted for
years.
We maintain that, although the Oswego Lake opinion gives the
public a path forward for lake access, it relied on an unsatisfactory,
antiquated test for determining title-navigability to control public access
from public lands to waterways in the state. Why public access from

under the Equal Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Oregon Constitution. Id. at 20–
21, 25; see infra notes 93–94 and accompanying text.
21 Kramer II, 446 P.3d at 17–18 (requiring the State and its localities to determine
whether the use of their police powers over public trust resources is “objectively ‘reasonable’
in light of the ‘purpose of the trust and the circumstances of each case.’” (quoting Rowe v.
Rowe, 347 P.2d 968, 971 (Or. 1959)). See infra notes 278−285 and accompanying text.
22 Kramer II, 446 P.3d at 14 (apparently approving a dichotomy between the public trust
doctrine and a so-called “public use doctrine,” seeming to limit the scope of the former to
waterbodies that were commercially navigable at statehood and restricting the parkland
access rights the court recognized to those waterbodies). See infra notes 138–140 and accompanying text (explaining the federal title test for navigability and its application to Kramer).
23 The Oregon Supreme Court also rejected the plaintiffs’ constitutional claim under the
Equal Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Oregon Constitution. Kramer II, 446 P.3d at
20–26. See infra notes 93–94 (discussing the Court’s rejection of the plaintiff’s constitutional
claim at length).
24 Kramer II, 446 P.3d at 19.
25 Id. at 1.
26 Id. at 12 n.12, 17–19.
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public lands to public waters should depend upon how a waterway was
used in 1859 lacks any appreciable policy justification, especially in light
of century-old precedent that recognizes the public’s right to recreate on
all waterways suitable for recreational watercraft.27 Moreover, the
opinion undermines the State by infusing a federal navigability test into
century-old state property law.28 It is far from clear why public access to
Oregon’s public waters should depend on a federal navigability test the
State rejected as unnecessary for public access a century ago. Despite
these jurisprudential shortcomings, there is no question the public gained
significant public trust rights in the Oswego Lake case.
II. THE LAKE AND THE MONOPOLY
Monopoly control of Oswego Lake began about eighty years ago.29
Until roughly around 1960, the public could access the lake.30 By then,
Lake Corp, acting in concert with the City of Lake Oswego on many
27 See infra notes 102, 128 and accompanying text (summarizing the test for title-navigability and the Oregon Attorney General’s recognition of the public’s use of waterways for
recreation).
28 Kramer II, 446 P.3d at 12–13.
29 STEPHEN DOW BECKHAM, OSWEGO LAKE, OREGON: A HISTORY OF ITS DEVELOPMENT
AND USE 69–70 (2014).
30 Developers, who were eager to rebrand Oswego Lake after the fall of the steel industry
in the late 19th century and prior to the incorporation of Lake Corp, heralded the lake as a
pristine respite from industrial Portland. See id. at 41 (providing examples of recreational
activities and promotion efforts to attract visitors to Oswego Lake). Depression-era federal
stimulus projects enhanced the recreational allure of the lake. See ANN FULTON, IRON ,
WOOD & WATER: AN ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF LAKE OSWEGO 94 (George Bergeron et al.
eds., 2002) (mentioning the City’s request for WPA funds and how federal funds supported
public improvements). One such project created the Oswego Municipal Swim Park in 1934,
now known simply as the swim park, a donation from the Ladd Estate Company, developer
for the Oregon Iron & Steel Company. Id. This park came burdened with covenants restricting access to the children of Oswego only, to mitigate local fears that Portlanders would
abuse the park’s amenities to the detriment of the Oswego residents. Id. City residents voted
to impose theses restrictive covenants excluding non-residents, over concerns of littering
and exaggerated fears of property damage. Id. However, the mayor at the time, William
Ewing, explained that the Ladd Estate Company intended to keep open the five acres at the
east end of the park “and never intended to eliminate lake access completely.” Id. Interestingly, the owner of the Oregon Iron & Steel Company, Paul Murphy—who would later attempt to monopolize the lake—echoed the mayor’s proclamation during a private settlement
in which he struck a deal with the Game Commission to allow public fishermen the right to
access the lake and in exchange, the Game Commission continued to stock the lake with
publicly owned fish. MINUTES OF MEETING OF THE OREGON STATE GAME COMMISSION
1353−54 (Sept. 11–12, 1936). From the 1940s to the 1960s, Oswego Lake was a highly valued
training area for the Portland-based Multnomah Athletic Club, which produced Olympic
swimmers during the 1940s. FULTON, supra, at 106–07. The incorporation of Lake Corp
ended this era of goodwill, quickly asserting its claim to the riparian boundary and lakebed
to the exclusion of all non-members. Id. at 103. See, e.g., Swim Area Will Close, SUNDAY
OREGONIAN, July 8, 1962, at 35 (discussing the long history of the Lake Oswego Swimming
Resort, which was open to all fee-payers); BECKHAM, supra note 29, at 50−51 (noting multiple outings to Oswego Lake by non-residents throughout the 1910−1920s).
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occasions, had nearly accomplished its goal of restricting access to
neighboring residents who were dues-paying members of the
corporation.31 The corporation’s authority to restrict access has never
been apparent,32 resulting in considerable conflicts over the years.33
These conflicts commonly arose when Lake Corp asserted regulatory
authority to control use of, and access to, the lake, maintaining neither
the State nor the federal government had regulatory roles due to the
uniquely private nature of Oswego Lake.34
Lake Corp’s actions were not without support. U.S. Congressmen,
Senators, influential attorneys, historians, and businessmen have all
endorsed Lake Corp’s goal to privatize the lake.35 Their skill, clout, and
perseverance were essential in rewriting the history of Oswego Lake,
helping legitimize Lake Corp’s ownership claim.36
In 1959, Lake Corp and the state government had one of their more
notable clashes when the State rejected Lake Corp’s claim to control the
use of recreational watercraft.37 Lake Corp’s defeat came at the hands of
the state attorney general, who concluded in a formal opinion the State
Marine Board had regulatory jurisdiction over all public use of boats on
Oswego Lake.38 The attorney general cited the Oregon Supreme Court’s
31 The Paul F. Murphy Company, a land development company responsible for part of
the city of Lake Oswego’s expansion, no longer wished to maintain cleaning, patrolling, and
insuring the lake. So, to avoid governmental control (and potentially higher taxes) and public access, 4,000 lakefront and lake access easement holders created the Lake Oswego Corporation to fill the developer’s void. See FULTON, supra note 30, at 102–04.
32 Id. at 104 (quoting Ward Smith, a member of the Lake Oswego Corporation’s first
board of directors, who observed, “[a]s far as we have been able to find out, there is no other
residential lake setup like this in the United States.”).
33 See supra note 30 and accompanying text; infra notes 319−320 and accompanying
text.
34 See FULTON, supra note 30, at 104.
35 Notable among Oswego Lake’s privatization leaders: Paul C. Murphy, president of the
Oregon Iron & Steel Company; Paul F. Murphy, owner of the Paul F. Murphy Company,
successor to the Ladd Estate Company; Mark O. Hatfield, former U.S. Senator and Oregon
Governor (R-Or.); Senator and former U.S. Congressman Ron Wyden (D-Or.); Les AuCoin
and Robert Duncan, former U.S. Congressmen (D-Or.); Lamar Newkirk, former editor of the
Oregon Journal; and Jack Kennedy, president of the Oregon State Bar Association . See
FULTON, supra note 30, at 102. See also A Bill to Exempt the Lake Oswego, Oregon, Hydroelectric Plant from Part I of the Federal Power Act and Section 408 of the Renewable Energy
Resources Act of 1980, and for Other Purposes: Hearing on H.R. 6657 Before the Subcomm.
On Energy Conservation of the H. Comm. Energy and Commerce and Power, 97th Cong. 3−4
(1982) (statement of Robert Duncan, Jack Kennedy, Counsel, and Lamar Newkirk, past
president, Lake Oswego Corp.) [hereinafter House Hearing].
36 See FULTON, supra note 30, at 4 (Senator Hatfield’s foreword proclaiming Fulton’s
retelling of the history of Oswego Lake to be a “great gift” as for the Oswego community to
rediscover its roots); House Hearing, supra note 35, at 6 (citing Lamar Newkirk’s oral testimony minimizing the original Sucker Lake name to “Sucker Swamp” before the committee
to emphasize the purported non-navigable nature of the lake).
37 1958–1960 OR. ATT’Y. GEN. BIENNIAL REP. & OPS 296, 296−97.
38 Id. (answering the director of the State Marine Board’s question as to the board’s regulatory authority).
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decision in Guilliams v. Beaver Lake Club39 in deciding the public had a
navigational easement to use the lake since it was (at least) navigable-infact.40 Consequently, the public had a navigational easement over the
lake, regardless of who owned title to the lakebed.41
That same year, Circuit Court Judge Ralph Holman enjoined filling
of the lake adjacent to a landowner’s property in the Lakewood Bay area
by a construction company.42 Judge Holman initially declared the lakebed
was state-owned, thus open to the public.43 He later withdrew the decree
to allow a so-called future “test case” to determine public access to the
lake.44 That case would not emerge until plaintiffs filed suit over a halfcentury later.
Twenty years after the run-in with the State Marine Board and
Judge Holman’s opinion, Lake Corp again made news attempting to
evade federal licensing for its small 500-kilowatt hydroelectric
generator.45 In a 1982 oversight hearing of the House Energy
Subcommittee, Senator Hatfield claimed the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission’s (FERC) assertion of jurisdiction over the hydropower
project on Oswego Lake was an unwarranted attempt to expand federal

39

Guilliams v. Beaver Lake Club, 175 P. 437, 439 (Or. 1918).
1958–1960 OR. ATT’Y. GEN. BIENNIAL REP. & OPS. 296, 296−97 (citing Guilliams, 175
P. at 439).
41 Id. at 297 (in short, where the public has access rights, the State has regulatory authority).
42 See Lake Oswego Title ‘Open,’ OREGONIAN, Sept. 15, 1959, at 8 (describing the 1959
suit filed by Carl Coad and his wife against Kuckenberg Construction for filling the lakebed
adjacent to their land on Lakewood Bay in Oswego Lake).
43 Id.
44 Id. It is likely that the reason for withdrawing the statement that the lake was open
to the public, was in response to a request by the City and Lake Corp, who had not participated in the suit. However, we have not been able to verify that request. See also BECKHAM,
supra note 29, at 58.
45 The Federal Power Act requires the Federal Energy Commission (FERC) to license
hydroelectric projects affecting interstate commerce. Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 817(1)
(2018). In 1976, when determining whether it had jurisdiction over the project, FERC asked
Lake Corp whether the electricity produced by its Oswego Lake project entered interstate
commerce. House Hearing, supra note 35, at 44. In 1977, Lake Corp petitioned FERC for a
declaration that Oswego Lake’s 500-kilowatt hydroelectric project was outside the scope of
the Commission’s licensing jurisdiction, referencing Congress’ earlier declaration in the Water Resources Development Act of 1976 that Oswego Lake was non-navigable for the purposes of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899. See id. at 65 (referencing Order Denying Reconsideration at 1, Lake Oswego Corp., 15 FERC P61,042 (1982)) (No. E−9601) (recording
the history of conflict between FERC and Lake Corp over the hydroelectric dam on Oswego
Lake). See also Hearing on S. 1573 Before the Subcomm. on Water and Power of the S.
Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 97th Cong. 51–52, 57, 59–60 (1982) (citing the
Water Resources Development Act of 1976, 33 U.S.C. § 59m (2018)) [hereinafter Senate
Hearing]. FERC, however, determined Oswego Lake has “long been part of a network of
general and commercial transportation” and issued an order requiring the project to obtain
a federal license because it met the definition of a navigable water on the Federal Power
Act. See id. at 62 (citing Order Finding Licensing Required, Lake Oswego Corp., 7 FERC
P61,122 (1979)).
40
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regulation.46 But FERC maintained it had no choice but to require
licensing because Oswego Lake affected interstate commerce, which
triggered FERC’s regulatory duties under the Federal Power Act.47 To
shield the Oswego Lake project from federal licensing, Senator Hatfield,
Congressmen Ron Wyden, and Les AuCoin convinced Congress to
statutorily exempt the hydroelectric project from the Federal Power Act
and the Energy Security Act in 1982.48 Lake Corp’s effort to maintain
control without federal oversight succeeded spectacularly.
The City’s Resolution 12-12, its third and most recent monopolization
effort, effectively bans public access from city-owned properties, a result
of Lake Corp’s distortion of Oswego Lake’s history and the City’s
willingness to accept it in order to maintain the status quo.49 The
resolution put the City’s police power behind Lake Corp’s monopolization

46

House Hearing, supra note 35, at 32.
Id. at 79. The navigational test for waters subject to Federal Power Act authority, 16
U.S.C. § 796(8) (2018), no longer links federal regulation to a waterbody’s historic navigability. See Robert W. Adler, The Ancient Mariner of Constitutional Law: The Historical, Yet
Declining Role of Navigability, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1643, 1674–75 (2013) (explaining United
States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 337, 426 (1940), where the Court decided
that Congress did not have to rely on navigation when it regulated hydroelectric power production under the Federal Power Act). Consequently, FERC believed it could regulate the
hydroelectric generator on Oswego Lake regardless of whether the lake was navigable under
the title-navigability test. See House Hearing, supra note 35, at 79. Lake Corp attempted to
disprove Oswego’s navigability, citing the historical record to show that passage of a steamship up Oswego Canal was impossible due to the narrow physical dimensions of the canal
as compared to the beam width of the steamboat. Id. at 75 (referencing Order Denying Reconsideration, Lake Oswego Corp., 1−5, 3 FERC P95,462 (1981)). FERC, however, determined the implausible steamboat use was not dispositive proof of non-navigability, given
other verified forms of transportation existed on Oswego Lake that demonstrated its navigability. Id. at 75−76.
48 The statute, which amended 16 U.S.C. §§ 791a−830 (2018) and 16 U.S.C. §§ 2701−708
(2018), was never codified in the United States Code but remains good law today: An Act to
Exempt the Lake Oswego, Oregon, Hydroelectric Facility from the Licensing Requirement
of the Federal Power Act, Pub. L. No. 97-345, S. 1573, 97th Cong. (1982), 96 Stat. 1646
(1982). It is likely that the Office of the Law Revision Council did not codify this amendment
because the amendment was not general enough to warrant codification. See About Classification of Laws to the United States Code, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
https://perma.cc/LU44-DP56 (last visited Nov. 9, 2020) (explaining that “[b]ecause the
United States Code contains only the general and permanent laws of the United States, not
every provision contained in those public laws goes into the Code”); House Hearing, supra
note 35, at 81–82. Note that Oswego Lake is considered non-navigable for purposes of the
Rivers and Harbor Act, 33 U.S.C. § 401 (2018) after it was amended by 33 U.S.C. § 59m
(2018) in 1976. This designation does not affect a federal title-navigability inquiry deciding
the applicability of Oregon’s public trust to title-navigable lakes with publicly owned beds.
Instead, it merely permits riparian owners to wharf out, dam, or bridge Oswego Lake without prior approval from Congress.
49 CITY OF LAKE OSWEGO, CITY COUNCIL REGULAR MEETING MINUTES 6 (Apr. 3, 2012)
(“The Council report notes the Council ha[d] . . . an informal process relating to the public
debate about public use or rights on the lake, that it prefers the status quo, that the Lake
is private.”).
47
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goal.50 This resolution prevents the public from reaching the water from
the City’s surrounding parklands, allegedly on public safety grounds.51
The plaintiffs in Kramer v. City of Lake Oswego disputed the validity of
the resolution.52
III. CHALLENGING THE CITY RULES
Following the city council’s unanimous adoption of Resolution 12-12
on April 3, 2012, plaintiffs Mark Kramer—a kayaker—and Todd Prager—
an open-water swimmer—filed suit in Clackamas County Circuit Court
against the City, claiming the resolution effectively eliminated their right
to access the Lake.53 The plaintiffs alleged three violations of their rights:
1) the State owned the water in the lake in trust for the use and
enjoyment of the public, 2) the State owned the lakebed in trust for the
public because the lake was navigable under both the State’s navigablein-fact test and the federal title-navigable test, and 3) the City’s rules
violated the Equal Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Oregon
Constitution by privatizing the lake for the benefit of a specific class of
persons.54 The plaintiffs argued the first two claims triggered the public
trust doctrine, claiming the doctrine preempted the City’s legislative
authority to modify the public’s access rights.55 The plaintiffs also sued
the State for not protecting their public trust rights and neglecting its
public trust duties, and sued Lake Corp for erroneously maintaining it
owned the lake and claiming the right to control access to it.56
A. The Trial Court’s Rejection of the Plaintiffs’ Claims
At trial, the plaintiffs argued the public trust doctrine warranted a
judicial injunction to force the City and the State to fulfill their trust
duties and to provide public access to the lake. The City defended
Resolution 12-12 and its swim park rule, claiming the public exclusion
was a valid exercise of its “home-rule” jurisdiction and was rationally
related to the purposes for which the City enacted it: to assure compliance
with deed restrictions imposed by Lake Corp and its predecessors, to
50 Kramer II, 446 P.3d 1, 6 (Or. 2019) (observing private parties own most of the property
around the lake, but the City has four public parks abutting the lake).
51 CITY OF LAKE OSWEGO, at 7.
52 Kramer II, 446 P.3d at 5.
53 Id. at 7.
54 See id. at 7. The Equal Privileges and Immunities Clause, in article I, section 20 of
the state constitution, forbids laws from granting special privileges to classes of persons or
individuals. See infra notes 93−94 and accompanying text.
55 See Kramer II, 446 P.3d at 7 (alleging the resolution and swim park rule are
preempted by the public trust doctrine because the State of Oregon owns the waters of the
lake).
56 See Kramer I, 395 P.3d 592, 597 (Or. App. Ct. 2017) (contending that Resolution 1212 infringed upon public rights, contrary to state law).
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protect public health and safety, and to preserve a limited city resource
for its residents.57 The City also explained it was not subject to public
trust responsibilities because the trust doctrine applied only to the State,
not to municipalities.58 Thus, if an affirmative trust duty existed, it was
the State’s.59
The State, on the other hand, asserted that it owned the bed of the
original Sucker Lake because surveyors meandered60 it in 1852. But the
State claimed the public trust doctrine applied only to submersible and
submerged lands, not to uplands, and in any event, imposed no
affirmative obligations on the State.61 Since it allegedly had no
affirmative duty to act against the City, the State felt no obligation to
determine whether the whole of current Oswego Lake was navigable.62
Lake Corp maintained it, not the State, owned both the lakebed adjacent
to the municipal parks and the riparian rights to adjacent lands;
therefore, the corporation controlled lake access.63
57 Id. See State v. Uroza-Zuniga, 439 P.3d 973, 974 (Or. 2019) (deciding that home rule
authority allows localities to regulate to the outer limits of their charters).
58 Kramer I, 395 P.3d at 597 (owning parklands adjacent to a public trust waterway did
not impose a duty on the City to provide access to the lake).
59 Id. at 597, 603.
60 See infra note 254 and accompanying text. A meandered lake is one where a federal
surveyor depicted its shoreline in a survey to facilitate federal land sales. In Oregon, the
State claims ownership of all meandered lakes. OR. REV. STAT. § 274.430(1) (2019) (“All meandered lakes are declared to be navigable and public waters. . . . The title to the submersible and submerged lands of such meandered lakes, which are not included in the valid
terms of a grant or conveyance from the State of Oregon, is vested in the State of Oregon.”).
At trial, the State claimed to own the lakebed of Oswego Lake:

Because Sucker Lake was meandered, the State asserts ownership to the submerged
and submersible lands underlying the original Sucker Lake. In addition, the State
believes that the original Sucker Lake meets the definition of navigable for title purposes based on historical information that it was used or susceptible to use for navigation at the time of statehood.
Defendant State of Oregon’s Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment
and Response to Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 3, Kramer II, 446 P.3d
1 (Or. 2019) (No. CV12100913), 2013 WL 10730653 [hereinafter State’s Trial Court Memorandum]. See also id. at 7 (“[T]he State claims to own Sucker Lake as a meandered lake and
as title-navigable.”).
61 Kramer I, 395 P.3d at 597 n.8 (noting that even though the state asserted ownership
over the bed of Oswego Lake as a meandered lake under OR. REV. STAT. § 274.430(1)
(2019)—and therefore presumptively a navigable water under the federal title test—the
State claimed that the public trust doctrine did not apply to uplands). See also State’s Brief,
supra note 12, at 3–4 (arguing that the State is not compelled by the public trust doctrine
to provide access to state-owned waterways through uplands).
62 See Kramer I, 395 P.3d at 610 (declaring that the public trust doctrine did not apply
to uplands like the parklands adjacent to the lake regardless of whether the State owned
the lakebed).
63 Lake Corp claimed that it owns the lakebed of Oswego Lake and Lakewood Bay, which
it maintains is a separate waterbody from Oswego Lake. See Formation of the Lake Oswego
Corporation, Info, LAKE OSWEGO CORP., https://perma.cc/BGP4-FQGU (last visited Oct. 6,
2020) (“The Corporation owns and operates the Lake.”). However, at trial the State asserted
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The trial judge, Henry C. Breithaupt, a tax court judge sitting by
designation, agreed with the State that the public trust did not burden
adjacent uplands and neither the State nor the City had any affirmative
obligations to provide public access to the lake.64 The court also concluded
that the resolution and swim park rules were valid exercises of the City’s
authority and did not violate article I, section 20 because the City rules
were not facially discriminatory.65 The State, the City, and Lake Corp
scored a thoroughgoing, if cursory, victory.
B. The Affirmance of the Court of Appeals
The plaintiffs appealed the trial court’s decision, arguing that the
lake is a public trust resource because, as a lake supporting recreational
watercraft, it is navigable under Oregon law and therefore subject to
public trust obligations.66 A unanimous court of appeals, in a decision by
Presiding Judge Rex Armstrong, was unpersuaded.67 The court agreed
with the trial court and the State that the public trust doctrine did not
extend to uplands.68 The appeals court also concurred that, regardless of
the lake’s status, there was no affirmative duty to provide access to a
navigable waterway from the adjacent public parklands.69

it owned the bed of the original lake, as meandered in 1852, pursuant to OR. REV. STAT.
§ 274.430 (2019) (claiming state ownership of all meandered lakes). State’s Trial Court
Memorandum, supra note 60, at 3. Consequently, Lake Corp refined its ownership position,
acknowledging the State’s ownership claim but maintaining it owns the remaining bed of
Oswego Lake and the bed of Lakewood Bay, allegedly there was a separate waterbody created by dams raising the level of the lake. Answer & Affirmative Defense of IntervenorDefendant Lake Oswego Corp. at 6–7, Kramer II, 446 P.3d 1 (Or. 2019) (No. CV12100913)
(“LOC now holds record title to the Property, including most of the bed and the banks of the
Bay and the Lake. LOC also holds reserved rights, including riparian rights, and the right
to enforce the Real Property Restrictions on littoral parcels owned by others, including the
City.”). Lake Corp claims title to lands inundated by artificial modifications in the lake created by a still-operational concrete dam erected in 1921 and a channel, dug in 1928, connecting Oswego Lake to Lakewood Bay. Id. at 6. See also FULTON, supra note 30, at 71, 91
(depicting the enlargement of Oswego Lake after completion of the channel and dam);
BECKHAM, supra note 29, at 55 (on the modifications).
64 Kramer I, 395 P.3d at 603–04 (presuming, without deciding, that the State owned the
bed of the lake because it was title-navigable under the federal test).
65 Id. at 610.
66 Id. at 597 n.7; Respondent’s Answering Brief at 2, Kramer I, 395 P.3d 592 (Or. Ct.
App. 2017) (No. CV12100913), 2014 WL 9865598, at *2. The State agreed with the plaintiffs
that 1) the State owned a portion of the lakebed, 2) there was a need to determine ownership
of the entire lakebed, and 3) the public has a right to use the lake for recreational purposes.
But the State denied it had any enforceable duty to provide public access to the lake over
land it did not own. Id. at 4.
67 Kramer I, 395 P.3d at 601–10.
68 Id. at 610.
69 Id. at 598–601.
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The court also rejected the plaintiffs’ Equal Privileges and
Immunities claim,70 deciding that the city’s resolution did not violate the
constitution since the restrictions applied to any person using the parks
without singling out any group.71 And the court upheld the swim park
rule because the City was allegedly complying with deed restrictions, and
the rule “preserv[ed] a limited city resource,”72 affirming the City’s
express discrimination against non-residents as a rational classification
not worthy of heightened scrutiny.73
Neither the trial court nor the court of appeals resolved the status of
Oswego Lake.74 But as discussed below, after the Oregon Supreme
Court’s decision, ownership over the lakebed and the scope of the severed
riparian rights are the primary factors that will determine whether the

70 OR. CONST. art. I, § 20 (“No law shall be passed granting to any citizen or class of
citizens privileges, or immunities, which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to
all citizens.”). See infra notes 93−94 and accompanying text.
71 The court explained that an article 1, section 20 violation requires a regulatory action
to “grant privileges or immunities to one citizen or class of citizens” at the expense of others
that would be similarly situated but for the preferential treatment. Kramer I, 395 P.3d at
610 (quoting State v. Savastano, 309 P.3d 1083, 1089 (Or. 2013)). Viewing the City’s exclusionary park rules against this constitutional floor, the court determined that the rules applied uniformly to all people thus complying with the constitution because the rules did not
confer a benefit to a specific class of person. Id. The court also opined that the fact that Lake
Corp reserves riparian rights to the private lakefront property and grants lake access easements does not make the City’s exclusionary rules discriminatory. Id.
72 Id. at 611–12 (stating the classification of resident versus non-resident and the banning of non-resident use of the swim park satisfied a rational basis analysis applicable when
classifications between people are based on characteristics that are not immutable because
the City’s deed restrictions required the bifurcation, and the discrimination was justified to
preserve a finite City resource). These deed restrictions, while written to simply prevent the
general public from overtaxing finite lake resources, were born out of earlier racial covenants established for the sole purpose of excluding people of color from Oswego Lake and
the surrounding community. Compare CLACKAMAS COUNTY, OR., DEED BOOK 132:166 (1913)
(“no structure other than single detached dwelling houses . . . shall be erected on the premises . . . in any manner used or occupied by Chinese, Japanese or Negroes, except that persons of said races may be employed as servants by residents.”), with CLACKAMAS COUNTY,
OR., DEED BOOK 358: 676 (1945) (“Grantor agrees that it was the intent and purpose of the
original grants of lake rights to . . . . exclude the general public from using Lake Oswego for
any purposes whatsoever, and the Grantor agrees therefore that it has always construed
and will construe any and all documents affecting use of said lake in such manner as to
accomplish those purposes, and protect said residents of Lake Oswego district against public
intrusion.”). See supra note 11, 63 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 191, 193, and
204 and accompanying text.
73 Kramer I, 395 P.3d at 611–12. The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed on this issue, see
infra notes 93−94, 280 and accompanying text, which seems to invite other forms of municipal discrimination against non-residents. See infra note 283 and accompanying text.
74 Kramer II, 446 P.3d 1, 8 (Or. 2019) (the trial court and the court of appeals assumed,
for the sake of argument, that Oswego Lake was title-navigable, and therefore owned by the
State).
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City’s exclusionary rules override the public’s paramount rights of public
access to public waters.75
IV. THE SUPREME COURT’S OPINION
Despite these resounding losses, the undeterred plaintiffs
successfully petitioned the Oregon Supreme Court to review the case.
They asked the court to recognize 1) state ownership over the bed of the
lake, 2) the applicability of the public trust doctrine to public uplands,
and 3) a state constitutional violation of the Equal Privileges and
Immunities Clause due to the City’s grant of monopolistic privileges to a
small group of its citizens.76 The court rejected the constitutional claim,
applying an extremely deferential standard of review.77 Otherwise, the
State’s interpretation of its public trust obligations was largely, and
somewhat surprisingly, rejected by the Oregon Supreme Court.78
The State’s position on its public trust obligations before the Oswego
Lake decision reflected a decidedly minimalist approach: it considered the
public trust to be restricted to submersible and submerged lands and to
impose no duties on the State other than restricting alienation of those
lands.79 A unanimous Supreme Court refused to endorse this narrow
state interpretation of the doctrine’s scope.80 The court rejected the
State’s position that its public trust obligations did not extend to
uplands,81 clarified that fish and wildlife are trust resources,82 and
determined that the doctrine imposed duties on the State to protect and

75 Id. at 10 (“We have emphasized, however, that for either category of waterway, ‘the
public has the paramount right to the use of the waters.’” (quoting Luscher v. Reynolds, 56
P.2d 1158, 1162 (Or. 1936))). See infra note 87 and accompanying text.
76 Kramer II, 446 P.3d at 5–6.
77 Id. at 8 n.4 (declining to resolve the status of the lake, remanding this fact-finding
investigation because the plaintiffs did not seek summary judgment to resolve the lake’s
status); see infra notes 93−94 and accompanying text.
78 Kramer II, 446 P.3d at 10–19.
79 State Brief, supra note 12, at 7 (acknowledging that “the people’s right to use that
land and the overlying waters—which includes all waters located in state owned waterways—for specified public uses, including navigation, fishing, commerce, and recreation.”
(citing Morse v. Or. Div. of State Lands, 590 P.2d 709, 711–12 (Or. 1979))).
80 Kramer II, 446 P.3d at 25–26.
81 Id. at 17. See infra note 105 and accompanying text.
82 Id. at 12 n.12 (“Water is not the only resource that the state holds in trust.”). See
Dickerson, 345 P.3d 447, 455 (Or. 2014) (explaining that “Oregon courts have long used the
metaphor of a trust to describe the state’s interest in wildlife,” and the State holds title to
wildlife in trust for the benefit of the public). See also Portland Fish Co. v. Benson, 108 P.
122, 124 (Or. 1910) (emphasizing that “title to the fish, before they are captured is in the
state in its sovereign capacity, in trust for all citizens.”). See supra note 19 and accompanying text. But see Chernaik, 367 Or. 143, 157−58 (Or. 2020) (explaining that while the wildlife
trust provides the state government the authority to “manage and preserve wildlife resources,” it imposes no affirmative obligations on the State (quoting State v. Pulos, 64 129
P. 128, 130 (1913)).
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manage the trust property for the benefit of the public.83 The court also
rejected the City’s claim that it had no public trust duties.84 These were
all significant advances in judicial recognition of the scope of the State’s
public trust doctrine.
The State’s errors in the Oswego Lake litigation were substantial
and should cause the attorney general to rethink her narrow
interpretation of the scope of the public trust doctrine. We elaborate in
the conclusion, for we think this case reveals the State, given its apparent
aversion to public trust litigation and its trustee responsibilities, may be
institutionally incapable of effectively implementing the public trust
doctrine going forward.85
The most puzzling aspect of the court’s decision was its view that,
only if the lakebed were state-owned, the public would have a right of
access from public uplands.86 Recognition of this access right lifted the
Oregon public trust doctrine out of waterways, although it does not
usually burden private uplands.87 Nor would the right exist if the lakebed
was private property, the consequence of the court’s apparent adoption of
a so-called “public use” doctrine.88 Since neither the Oregon Supreme
Court nor the lower courts resolved the ownership of Oswego Lake,89 the
Supreme Court sent the case back to the circuit court to make that
determination.90 Until then, the private monopoly over the lake will
continue. Despite applying the public trust’s protections to fish and
wildlife91 and extending the doctrine’s obligations to localities,92 the court
affirmed the lower court’s ruling that the City’s rules did not violate the

83

Kramer II, 446 P.3d at 17. See infra note 116 and accompanying text.
Kramer II, 446 P.3d at 19. See infra note 122 and accompanying text.
85 See infra notes 310−311 and accompanying text (discussing a proposed “legal guardian for future generations”).
86 Kramer II, 446 P.3d at 17, 19.
87 According to the court, public rights did not burden private lands, except where temporary and necessary to maintain access under the public use doctrine. Id. at 11 (citing
Weise v. Smith, 3 Or. 445, 450 (Or. 1869) (explaining the public use doctrine affords the
public the right to access private uplands only where “the burden on the landowner was
incidental and temporary . . . without imposing that incidental burden on the landowner,
the navigator could not continue” navigating the waterbody)). See also id. at 17 n.20 (explaining that Oregon joins “other states . . . reject[ing] the” right to cross private uplands
“with respect to private lands but have not considered the question of access rights from
public land.”).
88 Id. at 9.
89 Id. at 8.
90 Id. at 25–26 (explaining there are genuine issues of material fact precluding a determination as to whether the City’s park rules are a “‘reasonable’ restriction on the public’s
right of access.”).
91 Id. at 12 n.12. See supra notes 19, 82 and accompanying text. But see Chernaik, 367
Or. 143, 158 (Or. 2020) (seeming to assert that the public trust doctrine is a wholly separate
legal doctrine from the wildlife trust).
92 Kramer II, 446 P.3d at 18–19.
84
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Oregon Constitution’s Equal Privileges and Immunities Clause.93 The
court believed the city rules were a “reasonable” exercise of the City’s
authority.94 We discuss the court’s public trust reasoning below.
A. Moving the Public Trust Doctrine Upland, Amphibiously
The Oswego Lake court’s most significant decision was to elevate the
public trust doctrine out of navigable waters to uplands like the public
parklands, an amphibious evolution of the doctrine.95 The court
presciently recognized, although the trust doctrine was a matter of state
law, there was a federal minimum established well over a century ago by
the U.S. Supreme Court in Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois,96 which
93 Id. at 19–20, 25. The Equal Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Oregon Constitution provides “[n]o law shall be passed granting to any citizen or class of citizens privileges, or immunities, which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens.”
OR. CONST. art. I, § 20.
94 Kramer II, 446 P.3d at 25. The court decided that neither the functional monopolies
recognized by the City’s parks nor the swim park rules violated the Equal Privileges and
Immunities Clause. Id. at 20. The park rules were facially neutral, according to the court,
because they applied to “any person” using the parks to enter the lake. Somewhat surprisingly, the court concluded even if there was a monopoly of lake access, the government extended no special privilege but instead upheld the private property rights of the shareholders of Lake Corp. Id. The court’s willingness to look past the rule’s practical effect on the
public was startling. The reasoning seemed to be that since no one, including Lake Corp
shareholders, could access the lake from the municipal parks, the rules did not create a
privileged monopoly; instead, private property did. Id. But without the City’s rules, the private landowners could not exclude the public from the lake. It was, in fact, the combination
of the private lands and the rules that created the monopoly. The court’s lapse into formalism to uphold a functional monopoly was remarkable.
As for the swim park exclusion, which the court did recognize as a special privilege
granted by the City and based on city residence, the court refused to examine the non-residential exclusion under “strict scrutiny,” even though it acknowledged granting of monopolies (like those based on residency) was an “original concern” of the Equal Privileges and
Immunities Clause. Id. at 23. The court interpreted its prior case law to require only a rational basis for the swim park exclusion and affirmed the court of appeals’ determination
that the non-residential exclusion was reasonably related to the City’s purpose of preserving
recreational use by city residents, referring to the swim park as “a city-created recreational
facility.” Id. at 25. The City justified this non-residential discrimination on the basis of municipal costs, such as providing lifeguards. Id. The court dismissed the suggestion that those
costs could be paid through user fees because the court announced that if the city’s management choices are rational, it is immaterial that there exist superior available alternatives.
Id. This deferential standard of review allowed the court to approve the swim park rules’
express exclusion of non-residents, something the New Jersey Supreme Court disallowed
nearly a half-century ago. Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d
47, 54−55 (N.J. 1972) (concluding an ordinance excluding non-residents from a municipally
owned beach violated the State’s public trust doctrine). Reviewing municipalities exclusion
of non-residents on a deferential rational basis test seems designed to countenance future
municipal discrimination elsewhere in the State.
95 Kramer II, 446 P.3d at 17 (deciding that the public trust may require a means of public
access to an affected waterway, and interference with access may be a substantial impairment of the public’s right to use the waterbody for public purposes).
96 Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453–54 (1892).
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“set a floor for the management of public trust waters.”97 The court also
noted the state legislature codified the public trust doctrine by declaring
the State owned all the submersible and submerged lands of navigable
waterbodies.98 The court recognized the distinction between the public
trust doctrine and the equal footing doctrine—under which the federal
government implicitly conveyed title to the beds of commercially
navigable waters at statehood.99 Nevertheless, the court tied the scope of
the State’s public trust doctrine to those lands that were conveyed to the
State under the equal footing doctrine: submersible and submerged lands
under waterbodies that were susceptible to commercial navigation at
statehood, or around 1859.100 The court’s reasoning was sparse.
The court seemed to think the scope of the public trust doctrine was
a function of state title to lands, which is certainly not true in the vast
majority of states.101 No rationale was apparent in the court’s decision to
limit the scope of the doctrine in this manner in light of the fact that the
public has an undeniable right to recreate on all waterbodies meeting the
State’s definition of navigable-in-fact waters: those capable of supporting
recreational watercraft.102 More than once, the court described the
97 Kramer II, 446 P.3d at 12 n.13 (citing Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 453). Submersible
lands are those between the low- and high-water marks, while submerged lands are those
below the low-water mark. Kramer II, 446 P.3d at 13.
98 Kramer II, 446 P.3d at 13 n.14 (citing OR. REV. STAT. § 274.025(1) (2019)) (excluding
lands with prior vested property rights from state ownership).
99 Id. at 12 (citing PPL Mont., LLC v. Montana, 565 U.S. 576, 603–04 (2012)) (“We pause
to emphasize, however, that the doctrine of public ownership of the beds and banks of navigable waters and the so-called public trust doctrine are independent doctrines.”); id. at 9
(defining equal-footing doctrine).
100 Kramer II, 446 P.3d at 12 n.13 (adopting the federal test for determining a waterbody’s
navigability for the application of the public trust doctrine to that waterbody). See PPL
Mont., LLC, 565 U.S. at 577 (indicating the federal test for navigability determines “waterbed title under the equal-footing doctrine,” citing The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557, 563 (1870));
see also Adler, supra note 47, at 1647−50 (noting the varying applications of The Daniel Ball
test to the 1) federal regulation under the Commerce Clause, 2) federal navigational servitude, 3) admiralty jurisdiction, and 4) navigation of title test). See infra notes 131, 139 and
accompanying text.
101 At least the following 39 states do not limit the application of the public trust doctrine
to state owned resources: Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut,
Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin,
and Wyoming. See Michael C. Blumm, The Public Trust Doctrine in 45 States (Lewis & Clark
Law Sch., Mar. 2014), https://perma.cc/L9QD-M2AD, [hereinafter 45 States Survey].
102 Guilliams v. Beaver Lake Club, 175 P. 437, 441 (Or. 1918) (“Even confining the definition of navigability, as many courts do, to suitability for the purposes of trade and commerce, we fail to see why commerce should not be construed to include the use of boats and
vessels for the purposes of pleasure”); Luscher, 56 P.2d 1158, 1162 (Or. 1936) (“A boat used
for the transportation of pleasure-seeking passengers is, in a legal sense, as much engaged
in commerce as is a vessel transporting a shipment of lumber;”); 2005 Att’y Gen. 8281, at 2
(2005) [hereinafter 2005 AG Opinion] (“Recreation in this case includes use of small boats
for pleasure and fishing, as well as swimming.”).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3592003

2020]

OSWEGO LAKE DECISION

1245

public’s access right as “paramount.”103 Why the court thought the State’s
definition of navigable-in-fact waterways should not correspond to the
State’s public trust doctrine, the opinion never explained. As we elaborate
below, we surmise the dichotomy was due to the court’s acceptance of a
so-called “public use” doctrine propounded over a decade earlier by the
state attorney general.104 However, because the court did not cite the
Attorney General’s opinion, we cannot be sure.
The court decided that public trust uses could warrant public access
because the use may “require means of public access” to the water.105
According to the decision, denying public access to public waterways “can,
itself, be a ‘substantial impairment’ of the public’s right to use the water
for public trust purposes.”106 Thus, “the rights incident to public
ownership of the submerged and submersible lands beneath navigable
waters include a right of access to the public water from abutting public
upland.”107 This linking of the public right to access from adjacent public
lands to public ownership of adjacent submerged and submersible lands—
by no means a self-evident nexus—would lead the court to decide that
navigable-in-fact waterbodies had no such rights where the underlying
bed is privately owned.
The court maintained its extension of the public trust to uplands was
consistent with “the rationale” of judicial decisions in at least three other
states: it cited the Iowa Supreme Court’s declaration that state-owned
public land adjacent to a river was part of that state’s public trust
doctrine, the Montana Supreme Court’s decision that a private riparian
landowner could not prevent the public from accessing an adjacent river
from a nearby public bridge, and the New Jersey Supreme Court’s
recognition that the public had a right to cross private beach lands to
reach the ocean.108 A strange aspect of the court’s reliance on these cases
is that the last case clearly recognized public access across private lands
to reach public waters, something the Oregon court took pains to avoid.109
103

Kramer II, 446 P.3d at 10, 13–14.
See infra notes 128−136 and accompanying text.
105 Kramer II, 446 P.3d at 17 (quoting State v. Sorenson, 436 N.W. 2d 358, 363 (Iowa
1989)) (explaining the public’s right to access a public waterbody requires the State to protect this adjacent property under the public trust).
106 Id. (citing Morse, 590 P.2d 709, 712 (Or. 1979)).
107 Id. at 15–17. The court relied on Eagle Cliff Fishing v. McGowan, 137 P. 766, 767,
217–18 (Or. 1914) (involving a lessee of riparian lands who had a right of access over submerged lands against another private party who owned the submersible lands in question
and blocked the lessee’s access to the Columbia River); and Smith Tug v. Columbia-Pac.
Towing, 443 P.2d 205 (Or. 1968) (recognizing a public right of access to tidelands, submersible lands, and submerged lands, even where the State had conveyed a lease to a private
party).
108 Kramer II, 446 P.3d at 16–17 (citing State v. Sorenson, 436 N.W.2d 358, 363 (Iowa
1989); Public Land Access Ass’n v. Bd. of County Comm’rs of Madison Cty., 321 P.3d 38, 53
(Mont. 2014); Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355, 366 (N. J. 1984)).
109 See Kramer II, 446 P.3d. at 11 (interpreting Weise, 3 Or 445, 450−51 (Or. 1869)) (allowing a log-float operator to attach log booms to private lands, under a narrow exception
104
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The court’s reliance on the New Jersey Supreme Court was also a little
curious since it overlooked the fact that the New Jersey public not only
has a right to access public waters over private lands, but also to recreate
on private beaches under certain circumstances.110
Nonetheless, the Oswego Lake decision recognized a public trust
right to access public water from public uplands, moving the doctrine
amphibiously out of the water and onto the land.111 But the court’s linking
of the public’s access right to ownership of the submersible and
submerged lands, instead of to the State’s ownership of the water itself,
lacked any rationale and may encourage more municipal discrimination
in the future.112
B. Articulating Public Trust Duties
A significant question, as yet largely unanswered in public trust law,
is the criteria by which to judge government action implementing public
trust duties. Perhaps the leading case is from Pennsylvania, endorsing
the use of private trust principles of prudence, loyalty, and
impartiality.113 A wise commentator has recently suggested that private
trustee duties are less relevant for public trustee responsibilities than the
duties of conservation easement trustees.114
The Oswego Lake court invoked private trust law authority to
declare “a trustee has a duty to protect[] trust property”115 and to ensure
trust property is “managed in a way that will benefit all trust

for temporary uses of private uplands that are necessary for the public use); see supra note
87 and accompanying text.
110 The New Jersey case the court cited, Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, ruled
the public’s right was not limited to passage to the public waters but included reasonable
enjoyment of the public tidelands and ocean, as swimming require “intermittent periods of
rest and relaxation beyond the water’s edge.” 471 A.2d 355, 365 (N.J. 1984). The case also
established a four-part test for determining whether a privately owned beach was subject
to public access: “[1] Location of the dry sand area in relation to the foreshore, [2] extent
and availability of publicly-owned upland sand area, [3] nature and extent of the public
demand, and [4] usage of the upland sand land by the owner.” Id. A case that the court did
not cite, Raleigh Beach v. Atlantis Beach Club, ruled a private beach met the four-part
standard, and therefore had to accommodate public access. 879 A.2d 112, 121–25 (N.J.
2005).
111 Kramer II, 446 P.3d at 16–17
112 See supra notes 93−94; infra note 295 and accompanying text.
113 Pa. Env’t Def. Found. v. Pennsylvania, 161 A.3d 911, 932–35 (Pa. 2017) (adopting
private trust law to protect public trust resources and their proceeds by treating the State
as a trustee rather than a proprietor).
114 John C. Dernbach, The Role of Trust Law Principles in Defining Public Trust Duties
for Natural Resources, 54 U. MICH. J.L. REF. (forthcoming 2020) (concluding although all
trustees have duties of prudence and loyalty, the duties imposed on conservation trustees
are more appropriate analogies to public trust doctrine trustees than those imposed on private trustees).
115 Kramer II, 446 P.3d at 17.
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beneficiaries.”116 The court relied on the Restatement of Trusts to
construe the trust duties imposed on the State.117 This reliance led the
court to narrow the discretion that the State would otherwise employ
under its police powers and require the imposition of a standard of
“objective reasonableness” in a public trust doctrine case,118 which may
prove to be a significant restriction on state discretion, presumably
requiring the State to document with some specificity any decisions to
deny public access which the court considered to be a significant
impairment of trust resources.119
C. Applying the Public Trust to Municipalities
The City of Lake Oswego contended, fruitlessly as it turned out, it
was not subject to the same public trust obligations the State had.120 The
court had little difficulty in deciding the public trust doctrine’s obligations
apply to the City just as they do to the State.121 Thus, assuming the public
trust doctrine applies to the lake, the City could not substantially and
unreasonably interfere with the public’s paramount right to access the
lake.122
At trial, the City argued the public trust doctrine did not apply to the
municipalities because the State is the trustee for all public trust doctrine
waters, and assigning trust duties to municipalities would interfere with
the State’s responsibilities.123 This argument proved unpersuasive to the
Supreme Court, which ruled that the City is always an agent of the State
116

Id.
Id. (citing White v. Pub. Emps. Ret. Bd., 268 P.3d 600, 615 (Or. 2011)); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS §§ 76–79 (AM. L. INST. 2005) imposes the duty to administer the trust in
accordance with the trust’s terms and applicable law, the duty of prudence, the duty of loyalty, and the duty of impartiality on the trustee. In administering the trust, the trustee
must do so “diligently and in good faith, in accordance with the terms of the trust and applicable law.” Id. at § 76(1). Second, the trustee must also “exercise reasonable care, skill,
and caution as a prudent person would, given the purpose of the trust and if the trustee
possesses greater skill than that of a prudent person, the trustee has a duty to use that
skill.” Id. § 77(1)– (3). Third, the trustee must administer the trust “solely in the interest of
the beneficiaries.” Id. § 78(1). Fourth, the trustee must be impartial with respect to the individual beneficiaries. Id. § 79(1).
118 Kramer II, 446 P.3d at 17 (citing White, 268 P.3d at 615) (concluding that the trustee
did not breach its fiduciary duty to protect trust assets when entering into a settlement
agreement, because it acted reasonably to ensure the long-term vitality and stability of the
trust property).
119 See supra note 105.
120 Kramer II, 446 P.3d at 18.
121 Id. (observing if the public trust doctrine precluded an action by the State, the City
would be unable to take the same action).
122 Id. (explaining the City took affirmative action to enact the park rules to restrict access to Oswego Lake). See supra notes 21, 93−94 and accompanying text; infra notes 210,
275, 293 and accompanying text.
123 See Kramer II, 446 P.3d at 18 (disagreeing with the City’s argument that assigning
trust duties to the City would encroach on the State’s role as trustee for public resources).
117
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under the public trust and, therefore, may have violated its trust duties
by excluding the public from the lake.124 The court explained that
although home-rule authority provides municipalities in Oregon the
power to regulate to the fullest extent of their charters, no local regulation
can contravene either state or federal law.125 As an agent of the State, the
City was subject to the public trust doctrine and may have violated its
trust duties by creating the park rules to exclude the public from
accessing an alleged public trust resource.126 The decision was a complete
endorsement of the applicability of public trust law to municipalities,
consistent with several other jurisdictions.127 Thus, citizens may hold
municipalities to account for public trust violations, without the need for
the State to join the suit, which may encourage localities to be more
careful when considering ordinances excluding non-residents from public
trust resources or undertaking actions significantly impairing them.

124 Id. at 19 (explaining the Oregon Constitution delegates state authority to municipalities including any limitation or obligations that constrain state action).
125 Id. at 18 (citing to OR. CONST. art. IV, § 1(5), art. XI, § 2) (confirming the home rule
provisions directly grant municipalities the authority to exercise some of the State’s police
powers). But that delegation of authority did not alter the obligation of municipalities because they function as agents of the State. Id. (relying on Kinney v. Astoria et al., 217 P.
840, 845 (1923)) (articulating cities conveniently administer local law on behalf of the state
as its agent).
126 Kramer II, 446 P.3d at 19, 25 (concluding if the lakebed is state-owned, the City cannot
ban the public from accessing the trust resource from the city-owned public uplands without
an “objectively reasonable” basis in light of the public’s “paramount” access rights).
127 See, e.g., Williams v. Gallatin, 128 N.E. 121, 122 (N.Y. 1920) (establishing the rule
that the parks are protected by the public trust doctrine and any use of a park by the City
other than for encouraging public recreation requires direct legislative sanction); Raritan
Baykeeper, Inc. v. City of New York, 984 N.Y.S.2d 634 (N.Y. 2013) (determining the City’s
solid waste management facility was not a traditional or legitimate park use because it
deprived the public of recreational access, at odds with the purpose of the public trust doctrine ); Bd. of Trustees of Phila. Museum v. Trustees of the Univ. of Penn., 96 A. 123, 126
(Pa. 1915) (prohibiting the conveyance of public city park lands for private purposes);
Paepcke v. Pub. Bldg. Comm’n of Chicago, 263 N.E.2d 11, 19 (Ill. 1970) (citing City of Madison v. Wisconsin, 83 N.W.2d 674 (Wis. 1957)) (allowing the Chicago Park District to convey
a small portion of a public park to the school district to build a school by adopting the fivefactor test from Wisconsin courts: “1) that public bodies would control the use of the area in
question, 2) that the area would be devoted to public purposes and open to the public, 3) the
diminution of the area of original use would be small compared with the entire area, 4) that
none of the public uses of the original area would be destroyed or greatly impaired, and 5)
that the disappointment of those wanting to use the area of new use for former purposes
was negligible when compared to the greater convenience to be afforded those members of
the public using the new facility.”). See generally Mackenzie S. Keith, Judicial Protection
for Beaches and Parks: The Public Trust Doctrine Above the High Water Mark, 16 HASTINGS
WEST NORTHWEST J. ENV’T L. & POL’Y 165, 166 (2010) (addressing the amphibious nature
of the public trust and the limitations it imposes on municipalities’ use of parklands).
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D. Distinguishing Between the Public Trust and Public Use Doctrines
The most puzzling aspect of the Oswego Lake opinion was its refusal
to recognize public rights to all public waters from public lands. This
result was due to the court’s apparent endorsement of an Oregon Attorney
General’s opinion it never cited. Some explanation is necessary.
In 2005, the Oregon Attorney General issued a comprehensive
opinion on the scope of the State’s ownership and use of waterways in the
State.128 The opinion narrowly interpreted two Oregon Supreme Court
opinions, denying they were public trust decisions at all.129 In the first
case, Guilliams v. Beaver Lake Club, the court decided a riparian
landowner could not exclude the public from a stream that lacked titlenavigability, meaning the streambed was privately owned.130 The court
reasoned that although the State lacked ownership in the riverbed, the
public had the right to use it for boating without the permission of the
owner of the underlying bed.131 The court quoted from a Minnesota
128 2005 AG Opinion, supra note 102. The opinion responded to a request from the State
Land Board that the Attorney General explain 1) the criteria determining the ownership
interest the State acquired to waterways at statehood and whether there are limits on the
ability of the State to dispose of its ownership or restrict public use of these waterways; 2)
the rights of the public to use waterways whose beds are privately owned; and 3) the extent
of those rights and the types of waterways subject to them. The 33-page opinion concluded
the State acquired (with a few exceptions) all waterways subject to tides or which satisfied
the federal test of title-navigability at statehood. For those waterways, both federal and
state law limit the State’s ability to alienate its ownership if doing so would interfere with
the public’s use of the waterway for navigation, commerce, recreation, or fisheries. The 33page opinion also recognized that the public has the right to use waterways even where the
bed is privately owned if the waterbody has the capacity to enable boats to make successful
progress for navigation, commerce, or recreation (the so-called “public use doctrine” that the
attorney general constructed for these “navigable-in-fact waters”). “Recreation” includes
small boats for pleasure and fishing as well as swimming, and the public may use the land
adjacent to these waters if the use is “necessary” to lawful use of the waterway:

[U]nless state ownership has been confirmed by a judicial decree or the Board under
ORS 274.400 et seq., persons who use a waterway believing it to be state-owned incur
the risk that it will be held to be privately owned and that their use will constitute a
trespass – unless their use is authorized by the public use doctrine.
Id. at 1−2. See also Michael C. Blumm & Erica Doot, Oregon’s Public Trust Doctrine: Public
Rights in Water, Wildlife, and Beaches, 42 ENV’T L. 375, 383−84 (2012) (discussing the 2005
AG opinion).
129 2005 AG Opinion, supra note 102, at 16−17.
130 175 P. 437, 441–42 (Or. 1918).
131 Id. at 439 (citing Shaw v. Oswego Iron Co., 10 Or. 371, 375–76 (1882)) (highlighting
the four distinct classes of waterbody: “(1) Those in which the tide ebbs and flows, which are
technically denominated navigable, in which class the sovereign is the owner of the soil
constituting the bed of the stream, and all right to it belongs exclusively to the public. (2)
Those which are navigable in fact for boats, vessels, or lighters. In these the public has an
easement for the purposes of navigation and commerce, they being deemed public highways
for such purposes, although the title to the soil constituting their bed remains in the adjacent owner, subject to the superior right of the public to use the water for the purposes of
transportation and trade. (3) The streams which are so small and shallow that they are not
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Supreme Court opinion which stated that allowing private landowners to
exclude the public from these waterways was to create an unacceptable
monopoly because “[t]o hand over all these lakes to private ownership,
under any old or narrow test of navigability, would be a great wrong upon
the public for all time, the extent of which cannot, perhaps, be now even
anticipated.”132
The court reinforced those public rights a couple of decades later, in
Luscher v. Reynolds,133 concerning Blue Lake, an artificially enlarged
lake which allegedly was privately owned.134 Repeating the above quote
from the Minnesota court about the dangers of monopolizing waterways,
the Oregon Supreme Court described the public’s right as a public
easement or servitude.135 These public rights seemed to be an expansion
of the State’s public trust doctrine. But the Attorney General would later
use the easement or servitude language to diminish the scope of the
Oregon public trust doctrine, although without explicitly saying so.
The vehicle for diminishing the trust doctrine’s scope was the
invention of a newly named public right, the so-called “public use
doctrine.” According to the Attorney General, Guilliams and Luscher
were not actually public trust cases because the opinion assumed, without
citation of authority, the doctrine extended only to public lands that the
State owned.136 The Attorney General never acknowledged the existence
of the overwhelming number of jurisdictions recognizing the scope of the
public trust to be unrelated to public land ownership;137 but, limiting the
scope of the public trust doctrine to waters where the State owned the
beds would substantially reduce state duties and potential liabilities. The
creation of this “public use doctrine” did both. It limited the public trust
to state-owned lands and reduced the State’s obligations in the process;
convenient for the State, but not for the Oregon public, which lost
enforcement authority by the clever invention of a doctrine imposing no
duties on the State.
navigable for any purpose, the public has no right to whatever. (4) To this list may be added
our larger rivers susceptible of a great volume of commerce where the title to the bed of the
stream remains in the state for the benefit of the public.”). The Oregon Supreme Court in
Kramer focused on the second classification to support adopting the public use doctrine it
derived from the 2005 AG Opinion. Kramer II, 446 P.3d at 9; 2005 AG Opinion, supra note
102, at 17.
132 Guilliams, 175 P. at 442 (citing Lamprey v. Metcalf, 53 N.W. 1139, 1143 (Minn. 1893)).
133 56 P.2d 1158 (Or. 1936).
134 Id. at 1162.
135 Id. (applying the four-category classification for waterbodies, see supra note 131, and
quoting Guilliams, 175 P. at 439). See supra note 128 (discussing the 2005 AG opinion).
136 2005 AG Opinion, supra note 102, at 16−17.
137 See 45 States Survey, supra note 101 (summarizing widespread acceptance that the
public trust doctrine applies to waters (and sometimes lands) where the state has no ownership interest; these states include at least California, Florida, Maine, Massachusetts, New
Jersey, North Carolina, Utah, South Carolina, and South Dakota. The Nevada Supreme
Court recently declared that all waters in the state are subject to the public trust doctrine.
Mineral County v. Lyon County, 473 P.3d 418 (Nev. 2020)).
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Removing waterways whose beds are privately owned from the scope
of the public trust doctrine considerably diminished the reach of the
public trust doctrine in the State: only those waters susceptible to
commercial navigation in their natural or ordinary condition at the time
of statehood in 1859 qualify.138 The beds of these waterways are stateowned under what is known as the federal test for title.139 There are far
fewer of these waterbodies than those capable of supporting recreational
watercraft, which is the state test for a so-called “navigable-in-fact”
waterway and has been for over a century.140 In fact, the State considers
only fifteen river segments and seventy-four lakes to be title navigable,
and therefore public waters under a patchwork of legislative, judicial, and
administrative proceedings.141 Thus, the Attorney General’s public use
doctrine would substantially reduce the State’s trust responsibilities (and
potential litigation exposure) if affirmed by the courts. There was some
irony, however, in mapping the boundaries of the State’s public trust
doctrine with the federal title test rather than the State’s own navigablein-fact test,142 since it is unusual for a state to decide to circumscribe its

138 2005 AG Opinion, supra note 102, at 3 (adopting the federal test for navigability as
the threshold analysis when applying the public trust to waterbodies).
139 A waterway meets the federal test for title if there is proof of its use as a highway for
commerce at the time of statehood, or susceptibility to such use in its natural and ordinary
condition for trade and travel by a mode of transportation customary in that era. Kramer II,
446 P.3d 1, 9 n.8 (Or. 2019) (citing PPL Mont., LLC, 565 U.S. 576, 592 (2012)). The test
originated in The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557, 563 (1870). See also Oregon ex rel. State Land
Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 370 (1977) (quoting Mumford v. Wardwell,
6 Wall. 423, 436 (1867) (on the basis of the equal-footing doctrine, the state reserves a sovereign interest in the shores and submerged lands of all navigable waters within a state
because each state has “the same rights, sovereignty, and jurisdiction . . . as the original
States” in submerged lands underlying navigable waters).
140 Kramer II, 446 P.3d at 9–10 (stating Oregon protects public easements to navigate
waters that do not meet the federal test for navigability yet are still navigable-in-fact). Waterways susceptible to use by recreational watercraft have been considered to be navigablein-fact since Guilliams, 175 P. at 442. See 2005 AG opinion, supra note 102, at 17; supra
notes 128, infra notes 143, 155 and accompanying text.
141 See, e.g., Act of Feb. 14, 1859, ch. 33 § 2, 11 Stat. 383 (1859) (granting the titles of the
Columbia and Snake Rivers to the State); OR. REV. STAT. § 273.900 (2019) (confirming title
to the tidal influenced portions of the Coos, Coquille, and Willamette rivers); OR. ADMIN. R.
141-081-0050 (1976) (declaring segments of the Rogue, McKenzie, and Umpqua rivers to be
title-navigable waterways); Corvallis Sand & Gravel, 429 U.S. 363 (1977), remanded to 582
P.2d 1352, 1364 (1977) (declaring the non-tidal influenced portion of the Willamette river to
river mile 187 to be a state-owned, title-navigable river). See also State-Owned Waterways:
Rivers, STATE OF OREGON (Aug. 3, 2016) https://perma.cc/4P3Z-FRCK (listing state-owned
rivers along with authority declaring state ownership); see also Use of State-Owned Waterways: Lakes, STATE OF OREGON (Aug. 30, 2017) [hereinafter Navigable Lake List]
https://perma.cc/6WPK-QGTU (listing state-owned lakes, along with authority declaring
date ownership) (last visited Nov. 19, 2020).
142 2005 AG opinion, supra note 102, at 30 n.17 (“While a waterway’s ‘navigability’ is
determinative under both the federal test for state ownership of non-tidal waterways and
the state test for public use rights, the term’s meaning is not precisely the same for both
contexts . . . . For that reason, it is possible that a given stretch of waterway might not be
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authority in deference to a federal test that was not meant to trump state
jurisdiction.143
The Oswego Lake decision was the court’s first examination of the
State’s public trust doctrine in forty years.144 In it, the court appeared to
ratify the Attorney General’s public use doctrine—a doctrine which exists
in no other state—without citing the 2005 opinion,145 which no court had
previously affirmed. Interpreting both Guilliams and Luscher, the court
agreed with the Attorney General that waterbodies subject to the public
use doctrine have a public easement over privately owned beds because
they are “public highways for purposes of navigation and commerce.”146
The 1859 Oregon Statehood Act declared all navigable waters to be
“common highways and forever free,”147 an antimonopoly sentiment that
ought to inform the courts of the fundamental purpose of the State’s
public trust doctrine. Just ten years after statehood, the Oregon Supreme
Court, in Weise v. Smith,148 ruled a log-float operator could fasten log
booms on private uplands, characterizing the public’s rights to use rivers
like the Tualatin as a “public easement” or “public servitude.”149
The Oswego Lake court took pains to emphasize the use of private
property recognized in Weise was a narrow, incidental exception based on

title-navigable and therefore not state-owned, but nevertheless navigable-in-fact for purposes of the Oregon public use doctrine.”).
143 Since Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 57–58 (1894), the Supreme Court has indicated
that the scope of the public trust doctrine is a matter of state law. See PPL Mont., LLC, 565
U.S. at 604 (“Under accepted principles of federalism, the States retain residual power to
determine the scope of the public trust over waters within their borders, while federal law
determines riverbed title under the equal-footing doctrine.”).
144 Before the Oswego Lake case, the court had not investigated the scope of public trust
doctrine since Morse, 590 P.2d 709, 711–12 (Or. 1979), although it has interpreted the applicability of the federal title test under equal footing in, for example, Oregon v. Riverfront
Prot. Ass’n, 672 F.2d 792, 794–96 (9th Cir. 1982) (reversing the district court to declare a
portion of the McKenzie River title-navigable under the federal test). See also Nw. Steelheaders Ass’n v. Simantel, 112 P.3d 383, 387, 390, 395 (Or. Ct. App. 2005) (determining
whether segments of the John Day River were title-navigable and therefore subject to the
public trust); Hardy v. State Land Bd., 360 P.3d 647, 654 (Or. Ct. App. 2015) (determining
whether segments of the Rogue River were title-navigable and therefore subject to the public trust).
145 See Kramer II, 446 P.3d at 9−10; 2005 AG Opinion, supra note 102, at 16–17 (explaining the application of the public use doctrine to Oregon’s waterways).
146 Kramer II, 446 P.3d at 10 (agreeing with the 2005 AG Opinion, supra note 102, at 17).
See also Shaw v. Oswego Iron Co., 10 Or. 371, 375 (1882) (asserting that navigable-in-fact
waters did not meet the federal test to title-navigability). Courts long ago broadened this
test to recognize transportation for pleasure. See, e.g., Luscher, 56 P.2d 1158, 1162 (Or.
1936) (citing Guilliams, 175 P. 437, 442 (Or. 1918)).
147 The court cited the Oregon Statehood Act for the proposition that title to lands beneath navigable waters were granted to the State upon admission into the Union. Kramer
II, 446 P.3d at 8 n.5 (quoting the Act of Feb. 14, 1859, ch. 33, § 2, 11 Stat. 383) (“All navigable
waters of said State, shall be common highways and forever free, as well as to the inhabitants of said State . . . .”).
148 3 Or 445 (Or. 1869).
149 Id. at 449, 451; Shaw, 10 Or. 371, 382–83.
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temporary necessity and it did not recognize a general right-of-way to
cross private land to reach navigable-in-fact waters.150 The plaintiffs
never asked for such a right. Hence, the court’s concern regarding an
easement over private uplands was based on hypothetical facts not at
issue in the case, which was actually about access from public
parklands.151
Perhaps the court’s misplaced concern over perceived threats to
private property rights led it to decide so-called “public use doctrine
waterways” lacked access rights from uplands possessed by public trust
doctrine waterways. The court decided the easement language used in
previous cases to describe public rights in waterways whose beds were
privately owned “does not give [to one using a navigable-in-fact
waterbody] a right of way on the land.”152 This statement seemed to lose
sight of the fact the public already had a right to occupy the public
parklands at issue in the case.153 The real issue was whether the City
could stop its public invitees from entering public waters from public
lands. The court never gave a reason for failing to recognize such a right,
other than saying it had not recognized one before, overlooking the public
nature of the uplands involved in the case.154
The unsatisfactory result of the decision is private ownership of a
waterway’s bed could defeat the public’s paramount right to navigate and
recreate on a public waterbody, even from public lands, if the private
owners effectively control the local government. The decision never
indicated the court was aware of this potential monopoly power,
supplying no reasoning for why the private nature of the bed should
curtail the public’s ability to recreate on navigable-in-fact waters—a right
the court has recognized for over a century155—from public uplands. The
result will require the plaintiffs to show at trial Oswego Lake is navigable
under the federal test, a time-consuming and expensive proposition. The
following sections explore the issues that the remand must resolve.

150

Kramer II, 446 P.3d at 11.
The court noted that the plaintiffs sought “a declaration the owner of abutting land
must allow the public to use that land . . . .” Id. at 11 (suggesting that their claim could
impose an access easement burdening private riparian landowners). But the plaintiffs actually requested access only from adjacent public lands. Id. at 15. The court’s concern over
private rights to exclude the public was untethered to any facts in evidence.
152 Id. at 11 (quoting Lebanon Lumber Co. v. Leonard, 136 P. 891, 892–93 (Or. 1913)).
153 Id. at 15.
154 The court declared without mentioning the public uplands at issue, “[b]ut this court
has not applied the principle of a public easement to use the waterway to create a different
and additional public easement to use the abutting upland to reach the water in the first
place.” Kramer II, 446 P.3d at 10.
155 The public has had the right to use waterbodies suitable for recreational watercraft
since the Guilliams decision in 1918. 175 P. 437, 441–42 (Or. 1918); see supra note 146 and
accompanying text.
151

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3592003

1254

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

[Vol. 50:1227

V. THE HISTORY OF PROPERTY TRANSACTIONS AFFECTING OSWEGO LAKE
On remand, the trial court must determine the navigability under
the federal navigability test. The title-navigability determination will
require an examination of the use of the lake and surrounding lands at
the time of Oregon statehood in 1859. Moreover, the court will have to
address Lake Corp’s claim that it owns both the bed of Oswego Lake and
severed the riparian rights from the upland public parks surrounding the
lake. This assessment will require a historical accounting of the chain of
title to the lakefront properties from 1859 to the present. An examination
reveals the dubious nature of Lake Corp’s assertions.
A. Anglo-American Settlement: Introducing Property Rights to Waluga
The lake was originally an abandoned channel of the Tualatin River,
created 13,000 to 15,000 years ago during the Missoula Floods.156 The
original inhabitants of the area, the Clackamas people, who resided along
the lower Willamette, and the Kalapuya-speaking Tualatins whose
territory covered the Tualatin Plains, likely used the lake for harvesting
Wapato bulbs.157 These Native American tribes gave the lake its first of
three names—Waluga, meaning wild swan—after the birds that lived
there.158
Shortly before 1850, white settlers arrived and renamed the
waterbody Sucker Lake because of the abundance of suckerfish present
in its waters.159 Under the federal Donation Land Act of 1850, each settler
could claim up to 320 acres of land in the Oregon Territory, and some of
them established the first recorded titles in the area.160 Homesteads soon
156 Explore the Watershed, OSWEGO LAKE WATERSHED COUNCIL, https://perma.cc/6QRB2NCM (last visited Oct. 4, 2020) [hereinafter Explore the Watershed].
157 See BECKHAM, supra note 29, at 6 (discussing the high probability of canoe use on the
lake for the gathering of Wapato (Sagittaria latifolia), a plant found in shallow waters). The
Wapato plant produces edible tubers, a staple of the local tribes’ diets. Archeologists have
not found evidence of Native American settlements in the Oswego area, but projectile points
have been documented in several locations around the lake. FULTON, supra note 30, at 9.
158 Explore the Watershed, supra note 156. The pedigree of the name Waluga is in some
doubt. See Henry Zenk, Notes on Native American Place-names of the Willamette Valley Region, 109 OR. HIST. Q. 6, 29 (2008) (stating that the author could not find the source of the
name, Waluga, but the Tualatin Kalapuyan tribe’s name for Oswego Creek “translates as
‘sucker-place-creek’” which makes it more likely that the white settlers simply adopted the
Kalapuyan name for the creek and lake); Susanna Kuo, 1870s, OR. IRON CHRONICLES,
https://perma.cc/45HE-WG9E (last visited Dec. 7, 2020) (highlighting an 1881 map by
Borthwick Batty & Co. that identified Sucker Lake as “Tualatin Lake”).
159 FULTON, supra note 30, at 15 (“The pioneers named the creek [and lake] ‘Sucker’ because there were so many suckers there that they seined them to use for fertilizer.”).
160 See generally How the Donation Land Act Created the State of Oregon and Influenced
its History, OR. HIST. SOC’Y, https://perma.cc/V4H4-NCVL (last visited Oct. 16, 2020) (discussing the qualifications of settlers who were qualified to claim the free land and the federal policies that transformed a U.S. territory into a state). Most claims before 1850 were
640 acres because a husband and wife could each claim adjacent parcels and combine them.
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encompassed the lake, creating the foundation for private ownership
around present-day Oswego Lake.161
Albert Durham, a migrant from Ohio, was one of the first settlers
near the eastern end of Sucker Lake.162 He built a sawmill and dam in
1850 on the outlet of Sucker Lake on his Donation Land Act claim.163
Durham’s homestead wholly encompassed what is present-day downtown
of the City of Lake Oswego and three of the public parks at issue in
Kramer.164 In 1852, a surveyor, Butler Ives from the General Land Office,
surveyed Sucker Lake.165 His survey recorded baseline information about
the lake, including its location, circumference, and various widths,166
meandering Sucker Lake as a navigable waterbody two years after
Durham raised the level of the lake with his dam.167 The meander survey
had lasting effects on subsequent land surveys, and ensuing conveyances
of the Donation Land Act claims.168 For example, because the original
borders of Durham’s claim contained a portion of submerged land
subsequently inundated by the raised level of Sucker Lake,169 the
surveyor, Israel Mitchel, following a year after the first surveyor, Butler
Ives, subtracted the submerged land from Durham’s property, on the
assumption a person could not hold title to submerged lands under
navigable waters unless the United States had explicitly conveyed such
rights.170
Oregon Donation Land Act, OR. ENCYCLOPEDIA (Aug. 13, 2020), https://perma.cc/SJD7T93E.
161 Plat Image Original Survey, BUREAU OF LAND MGMT. GEN. LANDS OFF. RECS.,
https://perma.cc/W9N9-6CXL (last visited Oct. 20, 2020) [hereinafter 1862 Survey].
162 REV. H. K. HINES D. D., AN ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF THE STATE OF OREGON 489–90
(1893), https://perma.cc/9X24-LQ2P (last visited Oct. 28, 2019). According to the historian
Ann Fulton, Durham was native to Ohio who lived in Illinois for a brief time before emigrating to Oregon. FULTON, supra note 30, at 15.
163 Id. at 490.
164 See Plat Image Original Survey, supra note 161. See also FULTON, supra note 30, at
15, 91.
165 See BECKHAM, supra note 29, at 12.
166 Id. at 8 (explaining that the General Land Office contracted with Ives to assist in the
subdivision of Township 2 South, Range 1 East, Willamette Meridian by surveying and meandering all navigable waterways within the township). Ives apparently believed Sucker
Lake to be navigable and meandered it in 1852, observing that the dam raised the lake level
approximately six feet above its “natural level” yet preceded to find the “natural width” of
the lake based on the raised level of the lake. Id. at 2.
167 Id. at 12.
168 Id. at 61 (explaining that the General Land Office required surveys of Donation Land
Act claims surrounding Sucker Lake in 1853 to enforce the conditions of the statute and
provide more accurate legal descriptions of the parcels).
169 Id. (reproducing Mitchel’s field notes).
170 Id. (“The submerged lands were thus excluded from the Durham claim and remained
in title to the United States per the Oregon Treaty of June 15, 1846.”). Both the Oregon
Supreme Court and the U.S. Supreme Court largely ratified the surveyor’s assumption that
federal grants to private landowners did not usually include lands submerged beneath navigable waters. See Bowlby v. Shively, 30 P. 154, 159 (Or. 1892) (declaring a state’s absolute
ownership over tidelands comes from its sovereign authority; therefore, the State’s title was
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A decade later, Durham sold his land in a series of conveyances
between 1863 and 1864 and purchased fifteen acres of timberland on the
west end of Sucker Lake to supply his sawmill.171 Much like the land
surveys a decade before, the language in these conveyances and others
like it did not expressly convey ownership of the lakebed.172 The lack of
any private claim to the lakebed suggested its ownership remained with
the State.173
B. The Commercialization of Sucker Lake
After the discovery of iron ore deposits in the hills north and south of
Sucker Lake in 1861, commercial development expanded rapidly.174 The
increased activity led to many land transfers.175 Henry D. Green, one of
the founders of the Oregon Iron Company,176 purchased four acres of
Durham’s land at the mouth of Sucker Creek as well as Durham’s water
rights in anticipation of an impending iron rush.177 The Oregon Iron
Company quickly went to work purchasing and developing the tracts of
land and the water rights in the eastern end of the lake for “mining,
smelting, and manufacturing” pig iron.178 However, the company was
forced into foreculosure in 1876 after protracted legal disputes and

not affected by previous federal land grants), aff’d sub. nom. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1,
58 (1894) (construing a federal Oregon Land Donation Act claim to not include submerged
lands and establishing a presumption against pre-statehood grants, like those authorized
by the Oregon Act, unless the grant was to respond to a “public exigency” or to fulfill an
international treaty obligation).
171 See BECKHAM, supra note 29, at 14.
172 Id. at 65 (observing the deed language in the other land claims surrounding Sucker
Lake did not assign ownership of the lakebed).
173 Id. at 76 (questioning the validity of Oregon Iron & Steel’s conveyance of the bed of
Oswego Lake to Lake Corp because the previous conveyances to Oregon Iron & Steel did not
include the lakebed).
174 Oswego Iron Mines, OREGONIAN, Apr. 26, 1961, at 3 (heralding the discovery of iron
deposits around Oswego township). See also Fulton, supra note 30, at 29 (explaining that
the southern ore deposit, the Patton beds, were strip mined, while the workers extracted
the northern deposits at the Prosser mine, a shaft mine).
175 See BECKHAM, supra note 29, at 70 (“None of the eight, original landowners with property abutting the lake received nor conveyed any right, title, or interest in the lake excepting
the water right established in 1850 by Albert A. Durham for the operation of his sawmill
and grist mill on Sucker Creek.”).
176 Henry D. Green, who owned Portland Water Company with John Green and Herman
C. Leonard, began a lengthy and convoluted history of property consolidation of the eight
original donation land act claims by establishing the Oregon Iron Company in 1865. See
BECKHAM, supra note 29, at 16.
177 See BECKHAM, supra note 29, at 15–16.
178 Id. at 16. See Susanna C. Kuo & Rick Minor, The Oswego Furnace: Industrial Archaeology at the First Iron Works on the Pacific Coast, 42 J. SOC’Y FOR INDUS. ARCHEOLOGY 37,
40 (2016) (explaining that the facility principally produced pig iron).
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capitalization issues—likely a result of the national depression of
1873179—doomed the operation.180
A successor company, Oregon Iron & Steel, incorporated in 1882,
successfully produced pig iron for a number of years; processing 12,305
tons at its peak in 1890.181 At the same time, Oregon Iron & Steel
consolidated the remaining real estate around Sucker Lake to become the
single, largest landholder in the area.182 Still, none of the conveyances
contained language describing an ownership interest in the bed of Sucker
Lake by any party, reinforcing the presumption that the State owned the
lakebed since statehood in 1859.183
C. The Decline of Industry and the Rise of Modern Oswego Lake
In 1889, a narrow-gauge railroad began operating along the
Willamette River from Portland to Sucker Lake, increasing the number
of visitors to the area.184 But, the national economic Panic of 1893 stunted
the growth of the Oswego area when it forced Oregon Iron & Steel to shut
down its mining and smelting operations in early 1894.185 When it became
apparent that they could not financially restart the operation, the
company’s owners began exploring the possibility of converting their land
holdings into marketable real estate.186 They began promoting
recreational visits to Sucker Lake to attract home buyers for residential
development.187 In 1913, Sucker Lake was renamed a final time to
Oswego Lake, a more appealing name in the real estate market.188 The
179 Companies, both large and small plunged into bankruptcy. Even the Oregon & California Railroad, with its vast land holdings, collapsed during the economic depression.
BECKHAM, supra note 29, at 27–28.
180 See Kuo, supra note 178, at 40, 42 (stating that the furnace lay dormant from 1869 to
1874 following a “dispute over water rights with the owner of Sucker Lake dam” but resumed operations in 1874 under new management).
181 Oswego Iron Furnace, OR. ENCYCLOPEDIA (May 16, 2019), https://perma.cc/4PDH362F. Despite the successful production of pig iron, Oregon Iron & Steel quickly ran into
capitalization problems and internal power struggle issues that hampered its productivity.
FULTON, supra note 30, at 38−39.
182 BECKHAM, supra note 29, at 30. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
183 Id. at 67–68 (“The chain of title from Caleb Barnes [1851 donation land claim] and
Henry and Mary Prosser [1866 donation land claim] to the plat of Lake View Villas in 1912
by Oregon Iron & Steel Company nowhere identified ownership of any part of Sucker Lake.
The properties in the Lake View Villas subdivision reached to the margin of the lake and no
farther.”).
184 Id. at 41.
185 Kuo, supra note 178, at 43. The Panic of 1893 ended iron production in Oswego, transforming Reed’s dream of becoming a titan of the steel industry akin to Andrew Carnegie.
See FULTON, supra note 30, at 44–45.
186 FULTON, supra note 30, at 71−72. See BECKHAM, supra note 29, at 41 (explaining that
by 1912, Oregon Iron & Steel’s owners had surveyed and platted “Lake View Villas.”).
187 See FULTON, supra note 30, at 73 (incorporating tour-boat excursions to market its
land holdings).
188 BECKHAM, supra note 29, at 41.
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various deeds and subdivision declarations from Oregon Iron & Steel
confirmed its land ownership and those of its successors ended at the
meandered, artificially elevated shoreline.189
In a 1917 subdivision declaration of Lake View Villas, Oregon Iron
& Steel asserted, evidently for the first time, the right to control the use
of watercraft on the lake under the easement it claimed to possess as the
successor to the Durham water right.190 The watercraft restriction was
accompanied by a complimentary reservation of riparian rights to prevent
public access to or use of the lake.191 However, the language of the 1917
declaration, in keeping with all prior conveyances since 1850, omitted any
ownership claim to the lakebed.192
In 1941, lakefront landowners sought to acquire control of the lake
from the Oregon Iron & Steel Company.193 The lakefront owners
incorporated Lake Corp to assume control of access to the lake from the
Oregon Iron & Steel Company.194 On July 15, 1942, the company
transferred the lake’s so-called “rim,” a kind of riparian boundary, as well
as the lakebed itself to the Lake Corp,195 which claimed for itself the
“exclusive right and benefit . . . to use the waters and bed of the Lake
Oswego and all branches thereof, and inlets thereto, as a reservoir and a
conduit for power purposes.”196 Three years later, Oregon Iron & Steel
transferred its “right, title, and interest in and to the bed of Lake
189 Id. at 68 (reporting that the “Oregon Iron & Steel Company affirmed its riparian
rights to the meandered shore, as established by Butler Ives in 1852, or to the ‘artificially
created’ shore by construction of various dams at the eastern end of the lake” in the Lake
View Villas subdivision).
190 Id.
191 See id. (citing CLACKAMAS COUNTY, OR., DEED BOOK 148: 88 (1917)) (“The grantor
hereby expressly reserves unto itself, its successors and assigns forever, all and singular the
riparian rights and privileges appertaining to that body of water known as Oswego Lake as
meandered or artificially created which are now vested in the said grantor and (or) which
may hereafter arise or become appurtenant in or to said body of water.”).
192 See supra note 176.
193 See FULTON, supra note 30, at 102–03 (observing that the residents had grown accustomed to the lake maintenance services provided by Oregon Iron & Steel’s property management company and opposed the possibility of government control); supra note 31 and
accompanying text.
194 FULTON, supra note 30, at 102.
195 See BECKHAM, supra note 29, at 59, 68–69 (citing CLACKAMAS COUNTY, OR., DEED
BOOK 296: 244 (1942)) (describing the “property within the boundaries of Lake Oswego, as
artificially created or otherwise, to be conveyed to Lake Oswego Corporation”) (emphasis
added). Although the deed language demarcated the boundary at the “rim” of the lake, a
more accurate description of the boundary is the “ordinary high water mark,” meaning the
line on the shore that the water typically reaches during normal inflow and precipitation
years. Iowa v. Sorenson, 271 N.W. 234, 236 (1937). The Oregon Department of State Lands
interprets this definition as the line at which vegetation ceases to grow along the shoreline.
STATE OF OREGON, DIV. OF STATE LANDS, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON THE
NAVIGABLE WATERS OF OREGON 154–55 (1983).
196 Compare BECKHAM, supra note 29, at 69 with supra notes 63, 191 (showing markedly
different language from the deed in the transfer of Block 107 of the Lake View Villas, as the
deed now reserves an easement over the bed and waters of the lake).
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Oswego,” as well as a strip of land lying between the “ordinary high water
and the platted areas bordering on the lake” to Lake Corp, aiming to
exclude the general public from using the lake.197
Because of the 1942 and 1945 conveyances, Lake Corp now claims to
own both the riparian rights to, and the lakebed of, Oswego Lake,
maintaining that Oregon Iron & Steel severed riparian rights from all
lakeshore uplands.198 But Lake Corp’s ownership claim to the lakebed has
no basis in the company’s chain of title because, according to historian
Stephen Beckham, none of the original eight donation land claim owners
“received nor conveyed right, title, or interest in the lake” from the
State.199 And since there are no lakebed conveyances from the State to
any private landowner,200 the basis of Oregon Iron & Steel’s claim of
ownership seems to be made out of whole cloth.
The 1942 and 1945 corporate conveyances, in which the State never
joined, could not extinguish the State’s ownership. Although Lake Corp
also claims ownership of all riparian rights to access the lake due to the
conveyances, and private conveyances may reallocate riparian rights
among private parties, whether private parties may extinguish sovereign
rights held by the State in trust for the public to access public waters from
public lands is far from clear. The Oregon Supreme Court has declared
these public rights to be “paramount.”201
D. The City’s Efforts to Monopolize Oswego Lake
The City acquired property interests in three of the upland parks at
issue in the case from private owners who were successors of Oregon Iron
& Steel.202 It purchased Sundeleaf Plaza from private owners; Southern
Pacific Railroad still owns Headlee Walkway, having granted the City a
public easement; and the City acquired Millennium Park by eminent

197 BECKHAM, supra note 29, at 69–70 (citing CLACKAMAS COUNTY, OR., DEED BOOK 358:
675 (1945)) (clarifying and defining the “scope of the original [1942] grants to use the waters
of Lake Oswego” to “be advised as to the nature and extent of its obligations under said
deed”).
198 Id. at 61.
199 See id. at 69–70 (casting doubt on the validity of Oregon Iron & Steel’s riparian claims
to the inundated areas of Oswego Lake and concluding that it is fairly certain the company
did not have any viable ownership claim to the lakebed before the 1942 and 1945 conveyances to the Lake Corp). See supra note 63 and accompanying text. Cf. OR. REV. STAT.
§ 274.040(2)(b) (2019) (requiring all sales of submersible lands owned by the State to be
approved by the State Land Board).
200 See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
201 Kramer II, 446 P.3d 1, 10, 13−14 (Or. 2019); see supra notes 63, 87 and accompanying
text. See also infra notes 271–272 (on the jus publicum).
202 See Petition for Reconsideration of Respondent Lake Oswego Corporation at 910, Kramer II, 446 P.3d 1 (Or. 2019) [hereinafter Lake Corp’s Petition for Reconsideration] (maintaining the City acquired an interest in the three properties decades after Oregon Iron &
Steel developed and sold the lots).
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domain in 1990.203 Lake Corp maintains the three parks were subject to
a 1925 subdivision declaration of Oregon Iron & Steel in which it reserved
all riparian rights, similar to the 1917 deed to Lake View Villas.204
Even if Oregon Iron & Steel had the authority to sever riparian rights
from the lands it sold, it is hardly clear it had ownership of all riparian
rights to the lake when it conveyed the “rim” and the bed of the lake to
Lake Corp.205 Nonetheless, Lake Corp has maintained that even if the
City’s exclusionary resolution and swim park rules violate its public trust
duties, the City lacked rights of access to the lake in the first place
because of Lake Corp’s riparian rights.206 This argument erroneously
assumes that private property arrangements can destroy the State’s
sovereign rights.207
VI. A PATH TOWARD LAKE ACCESS ON REMAND
In challenging the validity of the City’s Resolution 12-12 on remand,
the plaintiffs must first show that Oswego Lake satisfies the traditional
federal title-navigability test.208 According to the Oregon Supreme Court,

203

Id.
Id. at 10. See supra notes 191, 195, 197 and accompanying text.
205 See BECKHAM, supra note 29, at 70 (“Nowhere in the conveyances did Oregon Iron &
Steel Company claim to have secured 100% of the riparian lands surrounding Oswego
Lake.”). Lake Corp acknowledged in a brief to the trial court that Oregon Iron & Steel no
longer owned the upland parcels that later became Millennium Plaza and Headlee Walkway
at the time those parcels became riparian in the 1920s or at the time they were allegedly
conveyed to Lake Corp in the 1940s. See Declaration of Jeff Ward in Support of Lake Oswego
Corporation’s Memorandum in Support of its Motion to Dismiss and Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, and in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at
9–11, Kramer & Prager v. City of Lake Oswego et al., No. CV12100913 (Clackamas County
Cir. Ct. 2012) (stating that the Oregon Iron & Steel Company conveyed the property that
comprises Millennium Park to private commercial owners in 1914, 1919, and 1924, as well
as what is now Headlee Walkway to the Southern Pacific Railroad before creating Lakewood
Bay). See also Declaration of Colin H. Hunter in Support of Lake Oswego Corporation’s Motion to Dismiss and Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, and in Opposition to Plaintiff’s
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 3, Kramer & Prager v. City of Lake Oswego et
al., No. CV12100913 (Clackamas County Cir. Ct. 2012) (describing the easement conveyance
from the Southern Pacific Transportation company to the City of Lake Oswego creating
Headlee Walkway in 1990); Lake View Villas Brochure, C ITY OF LAKE OSWEGO,
https://perma.cc/4Y3A-GDJB (last visited Nov. 19, 2020) (depicting Southern Pacific’s railway property as a separate estate from the Lake View Villas of Oregon Iron & Steel as early
as 1913).
206 See Lake Corp’s Petition for Reconsideration, supra note 202, at 10 (“[T]he city cannot
give plaintiffs or anyone else a right—to water access—that the city does not hold.”).
207 See infra notes 272–277 and accompanying text.
208 Kramer II, 446 P.3d 1, 12 (Or. 2019) (narrowing public trust protections to waters that
are title-navigable under the federal test). See supra notes 100, 122, 126 and accompanying
text. Interestingly, the 2005 Oregon Attorney General opinion splits the analysis into five
factors by separating “have been used or have been susceptible of use . . . as a highway of
commerce” into distinct categories: a novel interpretation. Cf. AG Opinion 2005 supra note
128, at 10 with PPL Mont., LLC, 565 U.S. 576, 600–01 (2012). For the purposes of applying
204
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the lake is a trust resource if it is title-navigable.209 If the plaintiffs
establish Oswego Lake is a trust resource, they can assert their access
rights to the public lake from the adjacent public parklands unless the
State can demonstrate an “objectively reasonable” justification for the
City’s resolution, which imposes a substantial burden on the public’s
paramount right to access the lake.210
To prevail on remand, the plaintiffs must show Oswego Lake is titlenavigable under the federal test and public access rights expanded with
the dam-induced expansion of the lake. And they must convince the
courts that private conveyances of riparian rights did not extinguish the
public’s access rights. This section discusses each of these issues in turn.
A. Is Oswego Lake a Traditionally Navigable Water?
Establishing Oswego Lake as a title-navigable waterway under the
federal test would not appear to be difficult. The task will require a
showing that, in 1859 or thereabouts, the lake supported or could have
supported commercial use.211 Although ascertaining the lake’s condition
160 years ago may prove taxing, it should not be a challenge borne by the
plaintiffs alone: The State should finally fulfill its trustee responsibility
by arguing for the public’s rights to access the public waterway of Oswego
Lake. Inaction by the State would neglect its fiduciary responsibilities to
the public.
In showing the lake was used, or was susceptible to use, as a highway
for commerce around the time of statehood,212 the plaintiffs and the State
can point to a wide variety of water-borne activities with varying degrees
of frequency as constituting actual use.213 Moreover, a waterbody is not
the federal test to Sucker Lake, we think that Oregon courts should follow the Supreme
Court’s interpretation of the test because title-navigability is not a question of state law.
209 Kramer II, 446 P.3d at 12–13 (declaring that if a waterbody is title-navigable, the
public trust doctrine applies). See supra notes 100, 126 and accompanying text.
210 See Kramer II, 446 P.3d at 1718; supra note 126 and accompanying text.
211 The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557, 563 (1870) (establishing the rule that waterbodies are
considered navigable in fact if at statehood, “they are used, or are susceptible of being used,
in their ordinary condition, as highways for commerce, over which trade and travel are or
may be conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on water.”) (emphasis added);
PPL Mont., LLC, 565 U.S. at 601 (explaining for a waterbody to be proven susceptible to
commercial use at the time of statehood, trade or travel must have been conducted on the
waterbody in its natural and ordinary condition in a manner customary to the era); see supra
notes 99, 131, 139 and accompanying text.
212 See 2005 AG Opinion, supra note 102, at 10−11, 13−14. A lack of evidence demonstrating actual commercial use around the time of statehood does not bar a waterbody from
satisfying the Daniel Ball test for navigability because the test requires only that the waterway be “susceptible” to commercial use, including waters used by personal watercraft. 2
WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, 3d ed. § 35.02(b) (Amy Kelly ed., LexisNexis/Bender 2020) (citing United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 407 (1940) (approving the
use of “simpler types of commercial navigation”)).
213 Judicial determination of a waterway’s susceptibility for use in commerce is a factintensive inquiry, determined on a case-by-case basis. See, e.g., Alaska v. Ahtna, Inc., 891
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required to have a record of commercial use if it was capable of supporting
commercial activity.214 This definition focuses attention on the physical
characteristics of the waterbody to determine if it was capable of being a
commercial highway,215 of “afford[ing] a channel useful for commerce.”216
Courts have not closely scrutinized the frequency of use at statehood;
a well-documented account of a single person infrequently using the lake
for personal or commercial transport could satisfy the susceptibility
criterion under the federal test.217 Under the relatively relaxed
requirements of this factor, courts have accepted an array of evidence and
invoked temporal flexibility when considering actual commercial use, or
susceptibility to commercial use, creating a relatively low bar for
demonstrating a waterbody’s historical suitability as a commercial
highway.218
F2d 1401, 1405 (9th Cir. 1989) (deciding present commercial use provided conclusive evidence of the lower Gulkana River’s susceptibility to title-navigation because the river had
remained relatively unchanged since statehood); United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S.
49, 56−57 (1926) (determining Mud Lake was susceptible to use as a highway for commerce
because early visitors and settlers, in small watercraft of the era, used the lake as a route
for travel and trade, despite its swampy features and limited economic activity around the
lake); Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9, 11 (1971) (explaining that limited use of the Great
Salt Lake by the few ranchers along its shores does not detract from the “basic finding that
the lake served as a highway and it is that feature that distinguishes between navigability
and non-navigability . . . . The lake was used as a highway and that is the gist of the federal
test.”); United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 82 (1931) (determining that personal or private
use by boats demonstrates the availability of the Green, Colorado, and San Juan rivers for
the simpler types of commercial navigation); AG Opinion 2005, supra note 102, at 11 (noting
that limited use does note negate a finding of navigability).
214 AG Opinion 2005 supra note 102, at 11 (citing United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 82
(1931) (deciding that proof of actual use was not necessary if title-navigability could be
proved under the susceptibility factor because historically the Green, Colorado, and San
Juan Rivers had limited contact with commerce due to the few people able to reach the
rivers)).
215 United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. at 82 (“[E]xtensive and continued [historical] use for
commercial purposes[] may be [the] most persuasive” form of evidence, but the “crucial question” is the potential for such use at the time of statehood, not “the mere manner or extent
of actual use.”); PPL Mont., LLC, 565 U.S. at 601 (allowing present day uses to inform a
historical navigability determination if the waterbody has not changed substantially since
statehood); see supra note 211.
216 See United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. at 76; AG Opinion 2005, supra note 102, at 11
(maintaining that the test does not require evidence of actual use as long as the evidence
proves the waterbody was capable of being a highway for commerce).
217 Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9, 11−12 (1971) (verifying that the Great Salt Lake
was not a part of any navigable interstate or international commercial highway did not
foreclose the possibility that the lake could be susceptible to some form of trade or travel).
218 Id. at 11 (“That is to say, the business of the boats was ranching and not carrying
water-borne freight. We think that is an irrelevant detail. The lake was used as a highway
and that is the gist of the federal test.”). See also United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. at 82
(confirming that the remoteness or lack of human settlement will not affect the waterbody’s
susceptibility to use as a highway for commerce, because that inquiry is determined on the
physical features of the waterbody); PPL Mont., LLC, 565 U.S. at 600−01 (citing United
States v. Utah, 283 U.S. at 82−83) (reinforcing the broad reading of the susceptibility of
commercial use factor by defining the standard to be the potential for the waterbody to
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As for Oswego Lake’s navigability, a court could conclude that people
actually used Sucker Lake commercially around the time of statehood, or
it was susceptible to use as a highway for commerce in 1859 or roughly
thereafter.219 Well before 1859, Native Americans frequented the area,
using dugout canoes for fishing on the Willamette River, and they
harvested Wapato bulbs in nearby lakes like Wapato Lake in the Tualatin
Valley.220 The historical record may be limited, but archeological sites
have confirmed indigenous tribes frequented the shores of what became
Oswego Lake.221 Documentation of canoe use on nearby waters by Native
Americans implies the use of similar canoes on Oswego Lake.222 In fact,
canoes used by the visitors to the eastern end of the lake suggests
commercial activity existed before white settlement.223 Similar canoe use
by Native Americans in the upper John Day River was sufficient to
convince the Oregon Court of Appeals of the title-navigability of that river

support commercial traffic); United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 20−23 (1934) (explaining
evidence of use of watercraft, which normally satisfies this factor of the federal test, can be
undermined by the degree of difficulty that the physical conditions of the waterbody impose
on such an activity, thus reducing its potential to support commercial activity.); Riverfront
Prot. Ass’n, 672 F.2d 792, 794−95 (9th Cir. 1982) (recognizing seasonal log floats on the
McKenzie River as adequate to establish commercial use under the federal test, since the
use does not have to be continuous, extensive, or relatively easy); Hardy, 360 P.3d 647, 659
(Or. Ct. App. 2015) (allowing post-statehood, and even present-day uses as evidence, including 1) log floats, 2) recreational boating, and 3) use of ferries); 2005 AG Opinion, supra note
102, at 10 (concluding that susceptibility for commercial use does not require actual use).
219 Hardy, 360 P.3d at 659 (citing PPL Mont., LLC, 565 U.S. at 600–01) (relying on poststatehood uses to demonstrate susceptibility to what would have been a realistic use at the
time of statehood).
220 See BECKHAM, supra note 29, at 1 (explaining the two types of cedar dugout canoes
used by local Native Americans: large cargo canoes and shallow-draft canoes used in harvesting Wapato bulbs).
221 Id. at 6. See also FULTON, supra note 30, at 9 (“Allan Morris, proprietor of Lake
Oswego swimming pool, found strong evidence of a large Indian campground last week
[1939] in the lakebed of Lake Oswego. The evidence consisted of a large number of Indian
arrowheads of different shapes and sizes and a 10-inch stone pestle” (quoting OREGON
JOURNAL, Mar. 27, 1939 at 2)). The Oregon Supreme Court in State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay
observed Native American use of ocean beaches long before the “beginning of the state’s
political history” could “satisfy” the requirement of antiquity necessary to establish a valid
customary use of ocean beaches. State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671, 673, 677−78
(Or. 1969).
222 FULTON, supra note 30, at 9−10 (“Rella McAllister noted that the Indians used the
lake for transportation: ‘Legend has it that the Indians often made use of this lake during
their travels from north to south as there was but a short portage to the Tualatin River.’”).
See BECKHAM, supra note 29, at 75 (asserting that Native Americans navigated Sucker Lake
for Wapato bulb harvesting and fishing).
223 The Oregon Attorney General, in 2005, advised that pre-statehood Native American
use is relevant evidence of commercial use but not itself determinative. 2005 AG opinion,
supra note 102, at 13 (citing Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory
Comm’n, 644 F.2d 785, 788 (9th Cir.1981)) (determining the White River to be navigable
from evidence of Native American canoe use and the transportation of shingle bolts). The
Oregon Supreme Court invoked pre-statehood Native American use, sua sponte, in justifying the public’s customary right to use ocean beaches. See supra note 221.
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reach.224 The Oregon Supreme Court suggested pre-statehood Native
American use was probative evidence in the past.225
Records of Anglo-American settlement and commercial activity
around Oswego Lake also suggest the lake was either used or susceptible
to use for commerce both before and after statehood.226 For example,
Albert Durham stored logs on the lake for his lumber mill in the 1850s.227
These logs were cut at convenient locations along the lake and floated to
the storage area pending milling.228
Oregon courts have approved log-float transport as a satisfactory
method of establishing use or susceptibility for commercial use.229
Moreover, many recent cases have used recreational activities to qualify
as trade or travel,230 reflecting the growing economic value that
recreational water activities provide to local economies.231 Under the
224 Nw. Steelheaders Ass’n v. Simantel, 112 P.3d 383, 392 (Or. App. 2005) (stating that
only six to eight inches of water in the river was necessary to demonstrate navigability,
since that was all that indigenous fishing boats in the upper John Day required).
225 See supra note 221, 223−224 and accompanying text.
226 FULTON, supra note 30, at 18 (explaining that Durham ushered Oswego into the industrial revolution by damming “Sucker Creek, near the foot of the lake, built his mill below
the dam, and used the lake as a log pond” in the years before and after statehood).
227 Id. See also BECKHAM, supra note 29, at 12.
228 BECKHAM, supra note 29, at 14 (observing that Durham’s land purchases in 1863 necessitated lake travel from his timber lands on the west end of the lake to the sawmill on
the east end of the lake).
229 See Riverfront Prot. Ass’n, 672 F.2d 792, 794−95 (9th Cir. 1982) (commenting that the
use of boats to navigate waterbodies was not the only way to determine the title-navigability
of the McKenzie River to river mile 37). See also Hardy, 360 P.3d 647, 660 (Or. Ct. App.
2015) (affirming that the State’s reliance on log drives to show the Rogue River was susceptible for use in commerce below river mile 100). The Attorney General interpreted commercial use to mean that waterbodies must provide a practical path for trade or travel during
some part of the year. AG Opinion 2005 supra note 102, at 13−14. Since Oswego Lake has
always retained water throughout the year, it is not subject to the water shortages that
affect ephemeral streams, which can cause them to fail the requirement that a waterbody
supply a predictable path for commerce or travel for a significant portion of the year. Id. at
12.
230 See, e.g., United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 82−83 (1931) (creating the possibility
that recreational uses could be determinative factors by incorporating a broad list of watercraft that could be considered in a navigability determination); PPL Mont., LLC, 565 U.S.
576, 601 (2012) (alluding to the growing importance of recreation as a determinative factor,
however, the court confined recreational evidence to support navigation only if the use was
similar to historical uses and could be submitted as evidence only if the waterbody had not
materially changed since statehood); Ahtna, Inc., 891 F.2d 1401, 1405 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing
Alaska v. United States, 754 F.2d 851, 854 (9th Cir. 1985)) (concluding that a recreational
business can be determinative of the existence of “trade” because “[n]avigability is a flexible
concept and ‘each application of the [Daniel Ball test] . . . is apt to uncover variations and
refinements which require further elaboration.’”); Hardy, 360 P.3d at 662 (“[W]e understand
the board to have found that the flow requirements for current recreational boats all along
the study segment . . . are similar to those for the dugout-type canoes that were customarily
used by Native Americans in the area for trade and travel in 1859.”).
231 Recognition of the commercial importance of recreational activities and industries is
the modern equivalent of courts extending commercial value to log floats because of its effect
on local Oregon economies. Hardy, 360 P.3d at 652−53 (citing OR. REV. STAT. § 274.404(2)(a)
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federal test, the Supreme Court, Ninth Circuit, and Oregon courts have
all ruled that log floats or recreational activities can satisfy the
requirement of navigability “for trade or travel.”232 The Oregon Attorney
General has recognized “[t]itle-navigability may be established by a
variety of uses,” and “[t]rade is not restricted to the use of boats for
moving goods in commerce.”233
Moreover, commercial transport clearly occurred shortly after
statehood. The Minnehaha, a seventy-foot, flat-bottomed steamer,
navigated Sucker Lake hauling cargo and towing logs in 1866, just seven
years after statehood.234 This sort of transport is a quintessential example
of the kind courts look for in making navigability determinations being a
widely accepted method of transportation of the era, which carried goods
of a commercial nature, within the stream of commerce, affecting both
national and international commerce.235 The cargo and log transport, if
not the prior Native American use, would likely prove determinative to a
reviewing court.

(2015), for the principle that the Oregon State Land Board may employ economic or public
interest justifications in making navigability determinations).
“Sufficient economic justification” exists when the Land Board decides that a determination of navigability will result in revenue accruing to the Common School Fund
from a leasable use (as defined by Division administrative rules) of the waterway
segment or underlying land (for example, the placement of marinas or log rafts, or
the extraction of aggregate).
OR. ADMIN R. 141-121-0010 (1996).
232 See, e.g., PPL Mont., LLC, 565 U.S. 576, 601 (2012) (allowing recreational activities
to support the probability of historical use on waterways substantially unchanged since
statehood); Ahtna, Inc., 891 F2d at 1405 (stating that a recreational business can be a determinative of the existence of “trade”); Riverfront Prot. Ass’n, 672 F.2d at 794–95 (allowing
log floats to satisfy the trade or travel requirement of the federal navigability test, despite
unfavorable seasonal flows and significant obstacles to free-floating log travel); Hardy, 360
P.3d at 659–60 (accepting evidence of timber transport from 1889 to demonstrate a type of
commercial trade that supported the Rogue River’s navigability at the time of statehood);
37 OR. ATT’Y GEN. 1342, 1355 (1976) (maintaining that if historic log floats are used to determine whether a waterbody is title-navigable, the floats must have been substantial, not
occasional or exceptional); see also supra notes 221, 229 and accompanying text.
233 See 2005 AG Opinion, supra note 102, at 13.
234 See BECKHAM, supra note 29, at 17 (explaining that the Minnehaha towed logs and
transported cargo across the lake as part of the Oswego timber industry’s supply chain);
FULTON supra note 30, at 18−19 (noting that Durham exported lumber as far as the Hawaiian Islands).
235 United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 76, 83 (1931) (citing The Montello, 87 U.S. 430,
441–42 (1874)) (recognizing that traditional commercial use is the engagement in transportation for hire, barter, or sale but reinforcing that title-navigability requires only proof that
the waterbody could sustain such activity, not that it actually occurred). See supra notes
215, 233 and accompanying text.
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B. Public Rights on an Enlarged Waterbody
The title-navigability test also requires the use of the lake in its
natural and ordinary state. This issue may be the most contested factor
on remand because dams have raised the lake level, beginning with
Durham’s dam in 1850.236 This dam is not a disqualifying factor if it
merely enhanced the lake’s navigability, rather than creating it, which
focuses attention on the condition of the pre-1850 lake.237 Durham used
the lake for log transport contemporaneously with the construction of the
first dam on Sucker Lake in 1850.238 Moreover, Native American use of
the lake before Anglo-American settlement may be determinative, since
the Oregon Supreme Court has suggested, in ocean beach access cases,
that such use could establish antiquity necessary to prove customary
use.239 The dugout canoes used by the Native Americans had small, flat
drafts, allowing for maneuverability in marshy, shallow waters for food
harvesting.240 Evidence of Native American tools, their Wapato bulb
harvesting practices, and the physical similarities of Oswego Lake and
nearby Wapato Lake all support the conclusion the lake was susceptible
to commercial use in its “natural and ordinary condition” before AngloAmerican settlement in the late 1840s and at statehood in 1859.241 Sucker
Lake clearly possessed a depth suitable for Native American canoe use
before the construction of Durham’s dam in 1850.242

236 The first recorded instance of artificial modifications of Sucker Lake was in 1850,
when Albert Durham dammed Sucker Lake to stabilize its water level, providing more consistent waterpower to drive his sawmill. See BECKHAM, supra note 29, at 55; Senate Hearing, supra note 45, at 53. Subsequent dam operators rebuilt the original dam four more
times resulting in the current concrete structure which replaced the older, washout-prone
wooden dams in 1921. FULTON, supra note 30, at 79. See supra notes 163, 167, 210, 215 and
accompanying text.
237 Although there is no Oregon case law on point, the Washington Supreme Court in
Wilbour v. Gallagher stated public rights associated with navigable waterways that were
subsequently dammed extended to the new elevation and reach of the enhanced waterway.
462 P.2d 232, 238 (Wash. 1969) (en banc). The court recited the principle that if the level of
a navigable waterway is raised and maintained for the prescriptive period, the new level
will be considered the natural level of the waterway and all submerged lands are “converted
into part of the lake bed and to state ownership.” Id. at 237 (citing State v. Malmquist, 40
A.2d 534, 538 (Vt. 1944) and Village of Pewaukee v. Savoy, 79 N.W. 436, 437 (Wisc. 1899)).
238 Beckham, supra note 29, at 33 (citing MARY GOODALL, OREGON’S IRON DREAM: A
STORY OF OLD OSWEGO AND THE PROPOSED IRON EMPIRE OF THE WEST 17 (1958) (confirming
that Durham’s lumber milling business began in 1850, using the water running through
Sucker Creek to power his prosperous venture)).
239 See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
240 See BECKHAM, supra note 29, at 6–7.
241 Wapato Lake is located 28 miles west of Oswego Lake and shares similar ecological
characteristics to Oswego Lake. Wapato Lake is now part of the Wapato National Wildlife
Refuge. Wapato Lake, About the Refuge, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV.,
https://perma.cc/WR86-XWMZ (last updated Mar. 29, 2017).
242 BECKHAM, supra note 29, at 1, 55 (noting that Durham’s dam raised the level of
Sucker Lake by six feet).
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Subsequent dams on the lake will not disqualify it as a navigable
waterbody.243 For example, a dam on Lake Chelan in north-central
Washington did not affect the navigable status of the lake and, in fact,
expanded the scope of public rights, according to the Washington
Supreme Court.244 The Oregon Attorney General agreed. In a case
involving Bonneville Dam’s inundation of Columbia River riparian lands,
the attorney general concluded that the newly submerged lands were
state-owned and subject to public rights, in effect treating the inundation
as equivalent to a natural change to the river.245 Thus, the dams on
Oswego Lake should not affect the lake’s title-navigability if it was
actually used in a stream of commerce or susceptible to such use around
the time of statehood.
C. The Presumption of Title-Navigability for Meandered Waterways
In addition to the title-navigable inquiry described above, another
means of establishing public trust protections for Oswego Lake is through
the State’s declaration it owns all navigable waterbodies in existence in
1859, under a statutory presumption all meandered lakes are titlenavigable and therefore state-owned.246 The Oregon Supreme Court
243 In its supreme court brief, the State limited its ownership claim to the original meandered border of Sucker Lake. State’s Brief, supra note 12, at 20.
244 Wilbour, 462 P.2d at 238–39 (concluding the artificial increase in water levels of Lake
Chelan due to the dam extended the public’s rights to the new ordinary high-water mark
because the public’s navigation rights ebbs and flows with the farthest reaches of a navigable waterbody).
245 The Attorney General explained there is a presumption in case law of treating any
permanent artificial change to a navigable waterbody as if the change were “caused by natural conditions.” 24 OR. OP. ATT’Y GEN. 323, 328 (1949), 1949 WL 40861 [hereinafter cited
as 1949 AG Opinion]. Citing considerable precedents from both Oregon and other states,
the 1949 opinion asserted that the State gained ownership in the newly submerged lands
behind Bonneville Dam, presumably also extending the public’s access rights in the water
overlying these lands. Id. at 326–28. The Attorney General reinforced the State’s ownership
rights recognized in the Bonneville Dam question 23 years later in an opinion involving Fish
Hawk Lake, created by damming Fish Hawk Creek, explaining:

In short, if Fishhawk Creek was navigable in fact and the public had the right to
navigate along its length at the location of the lake before any lake existed, the public
still has that same right in Fishhawk Lake. We do not see how that right could be
restricted to the portion of the lake immediately above the submerged thread of the
stream, and presume without deciding that it would extend to the entire navigable
extent of the lake.
35 OR. OP. ATT’Y GEN. 1202, 1206–07 (1972), 1972 WL 137705 (emphasis added).
246 OR. REV. STAT. § 274.025(1) (2019) (“The title to the submersible and submerged lands
of all navigable streams and lakes in this state now existing or which may have been in
existence in 1859 when the state was admitted to the Union, or at any time since admission,
and which has not become vested in any person, is vested in the State of Oregon. The State
of Oregon is the owner of the submersible and submerged lands of such streams and lakes
and may use and dispose of the same as provided by law”); OR. REV. STAT. § 274.430(1)
(2019) (“All meandered lakes are declared to be navigable and public waters. The waters
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mentioned these provisions as partly codifying the State’s public trust
doctrine247 but decided the cases interpreting them were of limited
relevance because they restricted the ability of the State to dispose of
trust lands and did not decide if the public had a right to access them.248
The court’s unwillingness to consider the effect of the statutory
presumption that meandered lakes are navigable was confusing since the
court decided navigable waters at statehood had a public access right
from adjacent public lands: “We conclude that the rights incident to public
ownership of the submerged and submersible lands beneath navigable
waters include a right of access to the public water from abutting public
upland.”249 For the defendants to prevail on remand, they must rebut the
statutory presumption that a meander survey designates Oswego Lake
as navigable waterbody.
Oregon statutes make clear all submersible and submerged lands of
all navigable streams and lakes now in existence, or which may have been
existence in 1859, are state-owned unless “vested in any person,”
presumably through an express conveyance from the State.250 Oswego
Lake (then Sucker Lake) was meandered in 1852, two years after Durham
built his dam raising the level of the lake.251 With no evidence in the
historical record of any state conveyance of the bed of Oswego Lake or
even any claim of private ownership before statehood,252 the statutory
presumption of state ownership should prevail on remand.253
There is an argument the statutes recognize only the titlenavigability of the original perimeter of Sucker Lake as meandered in
1852.254 The current lake encompasses roughly twice the size of the
thereof are declared to be of public character. The title to the submersible and submerged
lands of such meandered lakes, which are not included in the valid terms of a grant or conveyance from the State of Oregon, is vested in the State of Oregon.”); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 274.430(3) (2019) (the State’s ownership of the submerged lands does not impair “the title
of any upland or riparian owner.”).
247 Kramer II, 446 P.3d 1, 13 nn.14–15 (Or. 2019).
248 Id. at 13−14 (citing, e.g., Hinman v. Warren, 6 Or. 408, 412 (1877); Bowlby, 30 P. 154,
160 (Or. 1892); Corvallis & E. R. Co. v. Benson, 121 P. 418, 422 (Or. 1912)).
249 Kramer II, 446 P.3d at 17.
250 OR. REV. STAT. § 274.025(1) (2019).
251 See supra notes 166−167 and accompanying text.
252 See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
253 State’s Brief, supra note 12, at 20. See also State v. McIlroy, 595 S.W.2d 659, 663 (Ark.
1980) (“‘Mulberry Creek’ was ‘meandered’ by the surveyors. Meander lines are those representing the border line of a stream and such lines are considered prima facie evidence of
navigability.”).
254 The State asserts ownership of the original Sucker Lake under OR. REV. STAT.
§ 274.430 (2019) (declaring all meandered lakes to be “navigable and public waters”) but
seemed to maintain that its ownership of submerged land did not expand with a permanent
increase in the size of a navigable water because damming a non-navigable stream does not
create public rights. State’s Brief, supra note 12, at 19−20 (citing 35 Op Atty Gen 1202, 1207
(1972)). But of course, that reasoning does not apply to Oswego Lake, a navigable waterbody.
Moreover, it completely overlooked the State’s claim of ownership to the lands submerged
by Bonneville Dam. 1949 AG Opinion, discussed supra note 245 and accompanying text.
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original meandered lake.255 But there is nothing in Oregon’s public trust
statutes nor Oregon case law suggesting a lake meandered as navigable
could be bifurcated into navigable and non-navigable portions, let alone a
lake that was meandered after it was dam-enlarged. Practically, such line
drawing would be infeasible. Moreover, according to both the Oregon
Attorney General and the Washington Supreme Court, public rights
expand when artificial or natural changes enlarge a navigable
waterway.256 The enlargement of Oswego Lake post-meandering should
similarly expand the public’s rights under the State’s public trust
doctrine.
D. Lake Corp’s Claim of Riparian Rights
Although not discussed in detail in the Oregon Supreme Court’s
decision, Lake Corp claims ownership of all riparian rights on lands
surrounding the lake, based on the 1945 conveyance from Oregon Iron &
Steel.257 There are significant questions as to the validity of this
allegation.258 Oregon Iron & Steel owned the land that eventually became
three of the city parks at issue, and Lake Corp maintains the company
severed riparian rights from these uplands before selling them to
successors.259 The argument is that, without riparian rights, the public
parklands adjacent to the lake lack public access rights. But the City of
Lake Oswego believes the company’s reservation of riparian rights did
not include all the land adjacent to Oswego Lake and maintains that
riparian reservation applicable to one of the parks explicitly recognizes
the City’s right to use the lake “for swimming, bathing, and/or boating.”260
Since Lake Corp successfully petitioned the Supreme Court to clarify its
255 STATE OF OREGON, DIV. OF STATE LANDS, MAP OF LAKE OSWEGO (SUCKER LAKE) (1984)
(mapping the contrast in size of the 1984 lake to the original meandered lake bed). Note
that among the listed state-owned lakes is Wallowa Lake, meandered in 1880, a lake later
raised by a dam in 1905. See KENNETH MACKENZIE CRAIG, CONFLICTS IN THE MULTIPLE USE
OF WALLOWA LAKE 13 (1967); Navigable Lake List, supra note 141. The State makes no
claim that only the original Wallowa Lake is navigable.
256 See supra notes 237, 244–245 and accompanying text (discussing the inundation of
riparian lands by Bonneville Dam and the Wilbour decision). Other states agree that public
rights expand with rising waters. Parks v. Cooper, 676 N.W.2d. 823, 841 (S.D. 2004) (deciding that the public trust resides in the water itself, therefore depressions in the land that
fill with water can be converted to public use); McQueen v. S.C. Coastal Council, 580 S.E.2d
116, 119–20 (S.C. 2003) (applying the public trust to artificially created wetlands).
257 See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
258 See BECKHAM, supra note 29, at 70−71 (observing that Oregon Iron & Steel never
claimed to own 100% of the riparian rights around the lake).
259 See Lake Corp’s Petition for Reconsideration, supra note 202, at 9−10.
260 Letter of J.W. Ring et al., Legal Counsel to the City of Lake Oswego to Anita Huffman,
Oregon Dep’t of State Lands, at 5 (Aug. 5, 2011) [hereinafter Letter to the Dep’t of State
Lands] (concerning a dispute between Lake Corp and the City over a fill permit necessary
to erect a wave abatement structure; the City contended that the 1925 reservation of riparian rights did not apply to the northern half of Sundaleaf Plaza which expressly recognized
the City’s access rights to the lake).
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Kramer opinion did not decide this issue,261 the riparian rights question
will be before the circuit court on remand. However, Lake Corp’s
argument is contrary to the weight of authority.
The Iowa Supreme Court decided three decades ago public uplands
adjacent to the Missouri River were public trust lands just like adjacent
submerged lands.262 Thus, as sovereign lands held in trust, they were not
subject to the statute of limitations applicable to private property.263
Similarly, the Montana Supreme Court dismissed an attempt by a
riparian rights owner to deny public access from a public highway to
adjacent public waters.264 And the Wisconsin Supreme Court, after
carefully examining the relationship between public trust access and
riparian rights, concluded that a landowner with no riparian rights (due
to prior conveyances) nevertheless could invoke public trust rights to
access the adjacent waterway.265 These cases make clear that
conveyances of private riparian rights do not affect sovereign public trust
rights.
Although the Oregon Supreme Court declined to address the
question of whether private riparian rights could impair sovereign
rights,266 several of its decisions suggest a longstanding willingness to
recognize public rights to access public waters. For example, the court
refused to allow the owner of submerged lands to block access to Siltcoos
Lake of owners of land adjacent to the lake from public streets.267
Similarly, it twice ruled a lessee of submersible lands along the Columbia
River could not be denied access to the river by another private party,268
261 Kramer v. City of Lake Oswego (Kramer III), 455 P.3d 922, 924 (Or. 2019) (clarifying
that the court made no decision on the dispute over the effect of riparian rights on public
access to the lake from the city-owned parks).
262 State v. Sorenson, 436 N.W.2d 358, 363 (Iowa 1989) (taking judicial notice of the rising
importance of recreational activities and the need for access to waterbodies to facilitate such
activities, and remanding the case to allow the State to prove that it had a right to acquire
public trust assets created by accretion).
263 Id., cited in Kramer II, 446 P.3d 1, 16 (Or. 2019) (noting the court in State v. Sorenson
ruled that a statute of limitations defense could not prevent a state from asserting title to
land held in the public trust).
264 Kramer II, 446 P.3d at 16 (quoting Pub. Lands Access Ass’n v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs,
321 P.3d 38, 53 (Mont. 2014)) (noting that the public right to access a river from a public
right-of-way did not amount to an unconstitutional taking of private riparian rights because
the landowner never held a right “to exclude the public from using its water resource, including the riverbed and banks up to the high-water mark”).
265 Movrich v. Lobermeier, 905 N.W.2d 807, 815–20, 822 (Wis. 2018) (noting that although the private landowner could use public trust access rights, he could not install a
dock).
266 See supra note 261 and accompanying text.
267 Darling v. Christenson, 109 P.2d 585, 591 (Or. 1941), discussed in Kramer II, 446
P.3d. at 15 (noting that the Darling decision recognizing access from public streets “bear[s]
some similarity” to the issue of public access from public parklands).
268 Eagle Cliff Fishing Co. v. McGowan, 137 P. 766, 771 (Or. 1914); Smith Tug & Barge
Co. v. Columbia-Pacific Towing Corp., 443 P.2d 205, 218 (Or. 1968), discussed in Kramer II,
446 P.3d at 15−16.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3592003

2020]

OSWEGO LAKE DECISION

1271

even suggesting this result was due to reserved public rights (although
not defining those rights with specificity).269 The Oswego Lake court
recognized these decisions suggest ownership of submersible land
includes a right to access adjacent waters, “lend[ing] support” to the
notion public ownership of uplands designated for public use includes a
right of waterway access.270 The court, however, declined to be definitive.
Lake Corp’s riparian rights argument overlooks one of the core
elements of the public trust doctrine—the jus publicum—which
encumbers all trust land, whether it is private or public.271 A private
entity may try to sever all access rights to navigable water from the estate
restricting private successors, but the jus publicum is inalienable by
private conveyances.272 Oregon courts have recognized the distinction
between the jus publicum and the jus privatum since the Bowlby v.
Shively273 decision well over a century ago.274
269

Smith Tug, 443 P.2d at 218.
Kramer II, 446 P.3d at 16.
271 See, e.g., Esplanade Properties, LLC v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 978, 985 (9th Cir.
2002) (citing Washington case law that explains the jus publicum); Marks v. Whitney, 491
P.2d 374, 380−81 (Cal. 1971) (describing the State’s absolute jus publicum power over navigable water and land within the trust, unless expressly relinquished or altered); Parks v.
Cooper, 676 N.W.2d. 823, 838 (S.D. 2004) (affirming the State’s right to use, control, and
develop public waters as an “asset in trust for the public”); McQueen v. S.C. Coastal Council,
580 S.E.2d 116, 119 (S.C. 2003). See Michael C. Blumm, The Public Trust Doctrine and
Private Property Rights: The Accommodation Principle, 27 PACE ENV’T L. REV. 649, 658
(2010) (explaining the public trust doctrine, like private trusts, bifurcates trust resources
into two legal titles: the jus privatum, controlled by the private owner, and the jus publicum
controlled by the sovereign; these uses coexist on the same property in balance with one
another so as not to eviscerate either the public or the private property right).
272 See, e.g., Esplanade, 307 F.3d at 985 (quoting Weden v. San Juan Cty., 958 P.2d 273,
283 (Wash. 1998)) (“The ‘doctrine reserves a public property interest, the jus publicum, in
tidelands and the waters flowing over them, despite the sale of these lands into private
ownership.” (emphasis added)).
273 30 P. 154 (Or. 1892).
274 Id. at 155−56. For a discussion of Oregon court decisions that have recognized the
distinction between the jus publicum and the jus privatum, see, e.g., Morse, 590 P.2d 709,
711 (Or. 1979) (affirming the viability of the jus publicum, as prescribed by Illinois Central,
in Oregon when asserting the state’s interest in preserving water-related uses over the expansion of an airport); Brusco Towboat Co. v. State, 589 P.2d 712, 718 (Or. 1978) (recognizing the state’s sovereign, jus publicum, interest in regulating the leasing of submerged lands
under navigable waters); State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671, 679 (Or. 1969) (reaffirming that the jus publicum encumbers public property when title is conveyed to private
ownership, preventing the private owners from infringing the public’s customary right to
use the dry sand area of the beach); Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co. v. State, 439 P.2d 575, 582
(Or. 1968) (determining that private uses, like gravel dredging, may continue so long as they
do not interfere with public rights found in the jus publicum); Smith Tug & Barge Co. v.
Columbia-Pacific Towing Corp., 443 P.2d 205, 217–18 (Or. 1968) (acknowledging that the
jus publicum sets a floor protecting the public’s right in navigable waterways, but above
that floor, private entities may conduct business consistent with statutes and regulations);
Anthony v. Veatch, 220 P.2d 493, 504 (Or. 1950) (deciding that the jus publicum creates
public rights in fisheries from which the State may regulate their harvest); Johnson v. Jeldness, 167 P. 798, 799 (Or. 1917) (ruling that a private defendant could not subvert the public
270
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The conveyances of Lake Corp’s predecessor consequently could have
severed private riparian rights, the jus privatum, from the lands it sold
to its purchasers. Still, those conveyances could not destroy the State’s
jus publicum rights under the public trust doctrine. Thus, even if Lake
Corp and its predecessors severed riparian rights from the lands
surrounding the lake, Lake Corp would retain riparian rights to use the
water, obtain accretions, and wharf out into the lake—rights the
landowners surrounding the lake lack. But those private arrangements
could neither frustrate public access rights under the public trust nor
authorize substantial diminishment of trust resources any more than the
riparian right to construct wharves or docks can interfere with the
public’s navigation right.275 Public trust rights are sovereign rights,
recognized by the Oregon Supreme Court as paramount rights,276 and
cannot be disposed of through proprietary arrangements of private
parties conveying or severing ownership of riparian rights.277
E. Is the City’s Public Access Prohibition “Objectively Reasonable”?
If, as seems likely, the bed of Oswego Lake is owned by the State and
the lake itself is title-navigable—and therefore the public trust doctrine
applies—the public has a right to access the lake from the surrounding
public parklands unless the City’s ban on public access is, in the words of
the Oregon Supreme Court, “objectively reasonable.”278 Invoking private
trust principles to ascertain the appropriateness of sovereign actions
involving public trust assets, the court ruled the State, as trustee, “has a
duty to ‘to protect trust property’ and to ensure . . . that [trust property]
is managed in a way that will benefit all trust beneficiaries.”279 This
private trust standard led the court to conclude that the public trust
doctrine, if applicable, would require the City, as trustee, to demonstrate
its ban on public access was objectively reasonable in light of the purposes
of the trust.280 The court emphasized the paramount purpose of the trust
right in fisheries by claiming to act for the benefit of the public, since the jus publicum vests
sovereign authority exclusively in the State); Pac. Milling & Elevator Co. v. Portland, 133
P. 72, 75, 81 (Or. 1913) (concluding that a private riparian owner’s jus privatum because the
jus publicum impresses the paramount right of navigation over submerged lands under navigable waters subjecting the property to reasonable state regulation); Bowlby, 30 P. 154,
155−56 (Or. 1892) (upholding the state’s title, both jus privatum and jus publicum to tidelands conveyed by the federal government to state at statehood).
275 See Kramer II, 446 P.3d 1, 17 (Or. 2019) (recognizing that the denial of the public’s
right of access could amount to an impermissible “substantial impairment” of trust resources).
276 Id. at 10, 13−14.
277 As the U.S. Supreme Court has said, public trust rights are as inalienable as the
state’s police power. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. 387, 459 (1892).
278 Kramer II, 446 P.3d at 17−18.
279 Id. at 17 (citing White, 268 P.3d 600, 615 (Or. 2011)). See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
280 Kramer II, 446 P.3d. at 17−18.
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under the circumstances was to provide public access to trust
resources.281 How this paramount purpose may be achieved by a complete
ban on non-residents is hard to imagine.
If the City’s justification for restricting access to the lake is based on
conserving the limited resources of Oswego Lake from overuse, an alleged
conservation ban needs to overcome the fact that even the City has
acknowledged little or no boat use of the lake “for 75% of the year.”282
Moreover, similar attempts to impose all the burdens of conservation on
non-residents have failed elsewhere. For example, the New Jersey
Supreme Court long ago decided a shoreside city could not limit beach
access to its residents because discriminating between residents and nonresidents violated the public trust doctrine.283 The plaintiffs in the
Oswego Lake litigation never objected to reasonable non-resident fees, or
to reasonable time, place, and manner regulations.284 On remand, the
City must bear the burden of explaining why such regulations are
insufficient and why a non-resident ban amounts to an objectively
reasonable restriction in light of all the beneficiaries of the public trust
whose paramount purpose is to provide public access to trust resources.285
Meeting that burden would seem to be a tall order.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Oswego Lake decision significantly expanded the Oregon public
trust doctrine by enlarging its scope to uplands,286 reinforcing earlier
decisions about the public trust’s application to fish and wildlife,287 and
clarifying that municipalities serve as trustees.288 Before the decision, the
State held none of these positions. Just as importantly, the court rejected
the State’s position the public trust doctrine imposed no affirmative

281

Id. at 13–14, 17, 25−26.
Letter to the Dep’t of State Lands, supra note 260, at 8.
283 Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-By-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 55 (N.J. 1972).
The court later determined that a municipality could charge non-residents higher fees to
compensate residents for the local property taxes they paid, but not charge discriminatory
rates to nonresidents unrelated to the cost of maintaining beaches. Hyland v. Borough of
Allenhurst, 393 A.2d 579, 581 (N.J. 1978); Slocum v. Borough of Belmar, 569 A.2d 312 (N.J.
Sup. Ct. Law Div. 1989) (concluding that a municipality violated its public trust duty of
loyalty by charging a discriminatory beach admission fee to non-residents).
284 Kramer II, 446 P.3d at 6 (noting that the plaintiffs wish to invalidate the portions of
Resolution 12-12 and the Swim Park Rules that prevent public access to the lake). See also
Complaint at 7, Kramer v. City of Lake Oswego et al., No. CV12100913, letter op. (Clackamas County Cir. Ct. 2012) (seeking only reasonable access to and use of the lake).
285 Kramer II, 446 P.3d at 6, 10. The ban is technically a non-Lake Corp ban because it
excludes non-member residents.
286 See supra notes 84, 95, 105, 280, 264, 270, 275 and accompanying text, discussing
Kramer II, 446 P.3d at 16−17.
287 See supra notes 19, 26, 82, 91 discussing Kramer II, 446 P.3d at 12.
288 See supra notes 120−127 and accompanying text, discussing Kramer II, 446 P.3d at
18, 25−26.
282
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obligations on the State. Instead, the court invoked private trust
principles to articulate the State’s trust duties.289 Although it did not—as
other courts have290—expressly recognize the State’s trustee duties of
prudence, loyalty, and impartiality, the court’s invocation of private trust
law291 suggests it could do so in the future.292
The Oswego Lake court’s extension of the public trust to uplands
gave it an amphibious character, its most notable result. Although the
court’s reasoning on this issue was thin,293 its emphasis on the ownership
of the lakebed seemed to suggest the trust doctrine’s extension to uplands
was ancillary to ownership of submersible and submerged lands in the
same way the New Jersey Supreme Court defined the scope of public
rights to use private beaches: that use is necessary for the public to enjoy
publicly owned tidelands and ocean waters.294 Since Oregon’s tidal waters
are title-navigable, the public should enjoy access rights to all of them
under the Oswego Lake decision. But the court drew a bright line between
title-navigable waters and navigable-in-fact waters that was
unnecessarily confusing and leaves the vast majority of Oregon
waterways without access rights, even from public parklands. The result
may encourage municipalities to reserve public access to their residents.
The Oswego Lake court never even acknowledged preventing
municipalities from discriminating against non-resident was a concern,
eschewing such policy considerations.295 In doing so, the court was able to
decide lakebed ownership was determinative of public access to public

289

See supra notes 117−118 and accompanying text.
Pa. Env’t Def. Found., 161 A.3d 911, 932–35 (Pa. 2017). See supra note 113.
291 See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
292 In Chernaik, 367 Or. 143, 168 (Or. 2020), the Oregon Supreme Court rejected interjecting “all” private trustee obligations on public trustees in wholesale fashion as too disruptive but expressly decided that the public trust doctrine is “not necessarily fixed at its
current scope” but is capable of expanding “to meet society’s current needs,” as it has done
in the past. Id. at 158.
293 Kramer II, 446 P.3d at 16–17 (agreeing with the amphibious nature of the public trust
in Iowa, Montana, and New Jersey but failing to explain the reach of public trust rights on
uplands beyond adjacent public lands).
294 See Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355, 365 (N.J. 1984) (recognizing the public trust affords more than an access right on private beaches it also protects
the public’s right to use the beaches for rest and recreation.). See also Raleigh Beach v.
Atlantis Beach Club, 879 A.2d 112, 121–25 (N.J. 2005) (relying on Matthews, reaffirming
the right to rest and relaxation accompanies the right to access beaches).
295 See Kramer II, 446 P.3d at 20. The court’s cursory dismissal of the plaintiffs’ Equal
Privileges and Immunities claim, supra notes 93−94, may warrant revisiting, as municipal
discrimination is no theoretical threat. See Andrew W. Kahrl, Who Will Get to Swim This
Summer?, N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 2020), https://perma.cc/CL9X-KZEJ (addressing the social
phenomena of financially advantaged taxpayers withdrawing support for public spaces during periods of racial tension; removing access to recreational spaces like beaches for those
not as financially or socially advantaged). The State, as trustee of these public spaces, plays
an essential role ensuring that all residents may share in the State’s public trust resources
regardless of financial, social, or racial background.
290
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waters from public lands without any attempt to explain why this should
be so.
By ignoring the underlying anti-monopolistic purpose of the public
trust in favor of looking backward at previous court interpretations of the
doctrine, the court ratified (without citing) the 2005 Attorney General’s
opinion that substantially diminished the scope of the doctrine by
creating the so-called “public use doctrine.”296 This administrative
invention was the product of an extremely narrow reading of case law by
the Attorney General, invoked to relieve the State from protecting public
rights to a substantial majority of the State’s waterways, and which the
court seemed to accept without careful examination of the
consequences.297 Instead of scrutinizing the many public parkland cases
from other states, the court focused on Oregon cases involving private
uplands,298 and seemingly lost sight of the context of the case, which did
not affect private property rights at all.299 Worse, the court never thought
it necessary to explain why lakebed ownership—as opposed to state
ownership of the overlying water300—should be the litmus test for public
access to public waters.
The court’s evasion of these central issues is not costless. The
plaintiffs, represented by pro bono lawyers, must now marshal
considerable historical evidence about what sort of activity was taking
place on Oswego Lake in 1859 or around that time, as well as track a
byzantine array of private conveyances aimed at excluding the public over
most of a century. The court imposed these costs with no explanatory
reasoning for its unprecedented decision that ownership of submerged
lands is a prerequisite to public access rights from the public lands
surrounding the lake to public waters in the lake. Perhaps that holding
was the price for a unanimous decision. If so, the result is no less
disturbing.
The Oswego Lake case also calls into question the political dynamics
operative in the City of Lake Oswego, which have led the City to approve
a use monopoly for less than one-tenth of the constituents of its namesake

296 See supra notes 128−154 and accompanying text, discussing Kramer II, 446 P.3d at
17−18. See generally Carol M. Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and
Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 779 (1986) (discussing the importance of
public access to public property as an educating and socializing function, providing “social
glue” to a society).
297 Kramer II, 446 P.3d at 9−10 (Or. 2019) (seeming to adopt the public use doctrine for
waterbodies that are “navigable-in-fact”). Cf. 2005 AG Opinion, supra note 102, at 16 (inventing the public use doctrine without any clear indication that Oregon courts meant to
relieve the State of its trustee obligations for navigable-in-fact waterways). But see 45 States
Survey, supra note 101 (demonstrating that the majority of states protect the same navigable-in-fact waters under the public trust doctrine).
298 See supra notes 107, 109, 146, 149, 152 and accompanying text.
299 See supra notes 151, 154 and accompanying text.
300 See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
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resource while excluding the remaining city residents.301 This apparently
undemocratic result was supported unanimously by the Lake Oswego
City Council.302 The apparent incongruity is perhaps explainable by the
fact the minority interest in the democratic process protected an
organized group representing the wealthiest people of a wealthy
municipality. The result would be unsurprising to the founders of the
Public Choice political theory who predicted that organized, persistent
interest groups representing a minority could dominate the democratic
process.303 Lake Oswego politics may represent a paradigmatic example
of Public Choice political theory.
The State’s position in the Oswego Lake case also is worth
examining. The State denied fish and wildlife were part of the public trust
doctrine, that the doctrine extended to uplands, and that it imposed any
affirmative obligations on the State.304 The Oregon Supreme Court
rejected all these positions.305 But the court did adopt the Attorney
General’s diminishment of the scope of the public trust doctrine by
ratifying the distinction between title-navigable and navigable-in-fact
waterways. The latter—now described as subject to the novel “public use
doctrine”— apparently have no state obligations to preserve the public’s
right to access them, which constitute the vast majority of the State’s

301 See Easement Overview, LAKE OSWEGO CORP., https://perma.cc/Y8ER-VW7Q (last visited Nov. 19, 2020) (stating that approximately 3,000 homes have deeded lake access within
the City of Lake Oswego limits); Lake Oswego City, Oregon, Quick Facts, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU https://perma.cc/8TP4-RBK7 (last visited Nov. 19, 2020) (estimating that there are
39,822 residents of the City of Lake Oswego); supra note 31 and accompanying text.
302 Meeting Minutes, Lake Oswego City Council City of Lake Oswego, Regular Meeting
7 (Apr. 3, 2012); see supra notes 93−94 and accompanying text.
303 See, e.g., ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 27, 94–95 (1957)
(stating that interest groups try to simultaneously create real public opinion supporting
their views and convince government that such public opinion exists); Daniel A. Farber,
Public Choice Theory and Legal Institutions 4–5 (Univ. Cal. Berkeley Pub. L. Rsch. Paper
No. 2396056, 2014) https://perma.cc/2AJX-JGF5; PHILIP P. FRICKEY & DANIEL A. FARBER,
PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 23, 36–37 (1991) (explaining that small
interest groups are more likely to assert political influence because coordination is easier in
concentrated groups); JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF
CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 283–86 (1962) (providing a comprehensive review of the often decisive decision-making role that small interest
groups have on legislatures); KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES
48–51 (Wiley, 2d ed. 1963) (explaining the different outcomes that prevail when there are
two individuals and three alternatives); MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION
126–28 (1965) (claiming small, well-organized interest groups are successful because of their
commitments to causes); WILLIAM RIKER, THE THEORY OF POLITICAL COALITIONS 12 (Yale
University Press 1st ed. 1962) (examining the process of forming a subgroup within a larger
group that can decide for the whole).
304 See supra notes 12, 19, 26 and accompanying text. The State also denied that fish and
wildlife were trust resources in the Oswego Lake case, although not in the Monsanto case
concerning the cleanup of Portland Harbor. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
305 See supra notes 81−83 and accompanying text.
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waterways whose beds are not state-owned.306 Evidently, enforcement of
these public rights is left to the public, without state assistance.
Absent a change in policy from the State, its evident hostility to the
public trust doctrine leaves public rights in a perilous position, as the
State appears more interested in reducing its obligations than vindicating
public rights.307 One solution would be to establish a public enforcement
office without the conflict of interest that burdens the State. New Jersey
had a so-called Public Advocate that played an essential role in the
development of the public trust doctrine’s applicability to ocean
beaches.308 Although the Public Advocate did not survive New Jersey
politics,309 it served as a model for a proposed Office of Legal Guardian
for Future Generations drafted by an Oregon State Bar section in 2012.310
This guardian would fulfill the responsibility the State’s Attorney
General cannot: “to ensure that a clean, healthful, ecologically balanced,
and sustainable environment is passed on to future generations.”311 The
state legislature, largely reflecting the same interests opposed to public

306

See supra notes 128, 138−140 and accompanying text.
Even worse, in an ensuing decision, the Oregon Supreme Court apparently ratified
the State’s position in Kramer II, with respect to public resources not involving the State’s
waters or submerged or submersible lands, although the state had a trust authority to protect them but no trust duty to do so. Chernaik, 367 Or. 143, 164 (Or. 2020) (approving the
State’s position in the Portland Harbor Superfund site case, in which the State claimed it
was “trustee for all the natural resources in the state,” including fish and wildlife, water,
wildlife habitat, and “the bed and banks of every river within the state”). This position is
flatly inconsistent with the State’s position in the Oswego Lake case. Kramer II, 446 P.3d 1,
12 n.12 (Or. 2019); see supra notes 19, 82 and accompanying text. The Chernaik court ratified an optional trust doctrine by upholding the State’s incongruous position: The State may
act as a trustee when it chooses, but it may choose not to act to protect trust resources when
inconvenient. Judicial acceptance of this capricious position makes one doubt the existence
of viable separation of powers. The court’s approval of such rank inconsistency undermines
the public’s respect for the rule of law.
308 See, e.g., Matthews, 471 A.2d 355, 369 (N.J. 1984) (noting that the Public Advocate
argued for opening all privately owned beaches to the public). The New Jersey Public Advocate was a department in the executive branch of state government that acted as a voice for
the public, attempting to make the government more accountable through legal advocacy,
policy research, and legislative outreach. See, e.g., STATE OF NEW JERSEY, DEPT. OF THE
PUBLIC ADVOCATE, A VOICE FOR THE PEOPLE: 2008 A NNUAL REPORT (2009),
https://perma.cc/DGK3-QXYR.
309 The Public Advocate, created in 1974, abolished in 1994, revived in 2005, and again
abolished in 2010 is not currently slated for yet another revival. See Editorial: Bring Back
the Public Advocate, ASBURY PARK PRESS. (Oct. 29, 2017), https://perma.cc/G9L7-FYWB.
310 Oregon State Bar, Section on Sustainable Futures, Office of Legal Guardian for Future Generations (June 26, 2012), reprinted in MICHAEL C. BLUMM & MARY CHRISTINA
WOOD, THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCES LAW
440−44 (2d ed. 2015), and in the appendix to this Article.
311 Id. (citing Oregon State Bar, Section on Sustainable Futures, Office of Legal Guardian
for Future Generations § 2 (June 26, 2012)).
307
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rights as the Attorney General,312 is unlikely to authorize the guardian.
But Oregon voters, via initiative, might.313
On remand, the circuit court will decide the future of public access to
Oswego Lake as a function of the lake’s title-navigability determination.
To ascertain whether the public has a present right to access the lake
from public parklands, the circuit court must determine if the lake was
suitable for commerce in 1859 or roughly thereafter;314 however, strange
such a test might be. Even if the plaintiffs succeed in showing the bed of
Oswego Lake is state-owned, as seems likely, the City’s ban could still
stand if the City can convince the courts it is “objectively reasonable.”315
This standard would seem to require the City to shoulder the burden of
showing it cannot preserve the public’s paramount trust rights to access
Oswego Lake without preserving the lake itself. The fact the City finds it
necessary to exclude the vast majority of its own residents to preserve its
eponymous lake contradicts previous statements there are no boats—and
therefore, no human degradation—on the lake for three-quarters of the
year316 and imposes a substantial burden for the City on remand.
The case, filed in 2012, remains decidedly undecided after the court
left the central issue of access to Oswego Lake untouched, pending a titlenavigability determination. Not only is justice slow, it is expensive. The
plaintiffs’ attorneys, working pro bono, were not awarded attorney fees,317
even though the case contributed significantly to the State’s public trust
doctrine by elevating the doctrine out of the water, applying it to
municipalities, clarifying that fish and wildlife are trust resources, and
subjecting the State trustee to private trust principles.318 The case would
not have happened without their donated time. The State’s public trust
doctrine should not have to depend on the charity of private lawyers.
Adopting the Legal Guardian for Future Generations would make the
charitable impulse less determinative of public rights.
Ultimately, the Oregon Supreme Court’s Oswego Lake decision was
unsatisfactory because, despite seven years of legal proceedings, public
access to the lake remains unresolved. Justice should not be so slow. In
the case of Oswego Lake, a resolution is not likely to be forthcoming any
time soon. The ponderous pace of the legal proceedings benefits the
monopolists controlling access to the lake. But going forward, it is worth
312 See, e.g., Rob Davis, Polluted by Money: How Corporate Cash Corrupted One of the
Greenest States in America, OREGONIAN (Feb. 22, 2019), https://perma.cc/4NPA-3MSS.
313 See infra Appendix B for a possible initiative.
314 See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
315 Kramer II, 446 P.3d 1, 19 (Or. 2019). See supra note 278 and accompanying text.
316 See supra notes 282, 301 and accompanying text.
317 Order Den. Att’y Fees and Allowing Costs at 1, Kramer II, 446 P.3d 1 (Or. 2019) (noting that the court denied the fees without prejudice to request fees after the forthcoming
trial).
318 See supra notes 81−83, 116, 127, 278 and accompanying text. But see Chernaik, 367
Or. 143, 158 (Or. 2020) (refusing to apply “all” private trust principles to public trust cases);
see supra notes 8, 292 and accompanying text.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3592003

2020]

OSWEGO LAKE DECISION

1279

noting the Oregon Supreme Court described public access to be a
“paramount right” more than once.319 Perhaps on remand, the lower
courts will take that admonition seriously and recognize the State’s
sovereign duty to protect public rights to the lake cannot be subjected to
termination through private arrangements by Lake Corp and its
predecessor.320 If so, the plaintiffs, who have contributed considerably to
the development of Oregon public trust law, may finally be rewarded by
actually being able to swim in, and boat on, the public waters of Oswego
Lake.
VIII. APPENDICES
Appendix A—Response to Dean Huffman’s “Muddy Waters” Comment*
Our friend, former colleague and dean, Jim Huffman, well known as
the Darth Vader of the public trust doctrine,321 dashed off a comment on
the Oswego Lake decision322 while this Article was in production without
our knowledge. We use this addendum to this Article to respond to Dean
Huffman because while we agree with him that the Oregon Supreme
Court’s decision is problematic, several of his criticisms were well wide of
the mark, the comment contained important omissions, and a number of
its statements were inaccurate.
First, we agree with Dean Huffman that the so-called “public use”
doctrine, which the court distinguished from the public trust doctrine, has
little to recommend it, as there is no functional difference between the
two doctrines in terms of the public’s right to use waterways.323 Since the
dean’s project has been to argue the public trust doctrine is merely a
public easement for navigation and fishing, he does not see the need for a
“public use” doctrine recognized as an easement.324 While we agree, we do
not share his view that the public trust doctrine is merely a public access
319

Kramer II, 446 P.3d at 10, 13–14.
See supra notes 197, 277 and accompanying text.
* Thanks to Mary Wood, Greg Adams, Todd Prager, and Kathleen Blumm for comments on
this Addendum.
321 See Michael C. Blumm, Public Property and the Democratization of Western Water
Law: A Modern View of the Public Trust Doctrine, 19 ENV’T L. 573, 597 n.108 (1989) (describing Dean Huffman as the “Darth Vader of the public trust”).
322 James L. Huffman, Oregon Supreme Court Muddies the Waters: Kramer v. City of
Lake Oswego, 50 ENV’T L. 455 (2020). Jim is perhaps the most frequent and longstanding
critic of the doctrine, as evident in some of his many writings which his article references.
See, e.g., id. at 456 nn. 4−19; 460 nn.33−34; 466 n.71; 468 n.89; 473 n.114. For a review of
some of his scholarship, see Michael C. Blumm, The Water Law Scholarship of Jim Huffman
and Janet Neuman: Prologue to the Festschrift, 41 ENV’T L. 1, 2−6 (2012).
323 Huffman, supra note 322, at 463−67. For our criticism of the court’s ratification of the
public use doctrine, see supra notes 128−137 and accompanying text.
324 Huffman, supra note 322, at 1 (“It erroneously seeks to explain the public trust doctrine in terms of the law of trusts rather than as an easement or servitude on properties in
submerged and riparian lands.”).
320
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easement; it also is an inherent limit on sovereignty that imposes a
fiduciary obligation to protect trust resources from “substantial
impairment.”325 This aspect of the public property right is not an access
easement but is instead akin to a restrictive servitude. In his effort to
narrow the scope of the doctrine, Dean Huffman does not recognize its
existence as a limitation on government.
Nor, as Dean Huffman suggested, is the public trust doctrine limited
to navigation and fishing. For over a century, courts have expanded the
scope of trust resources to include recreational uses,326 such as those at
issue in the Oswego Lake case. Environmental preservation has been a
trust purpose for nearly a half-century.327 So, Dean Huffman’s objection
to the “public use” doctrine is a product of mischaracterizing the scope of
the public trust doctrine. Our objection, on the other hand, is based on the
fact the “public use” doctrine apparently relieves the State of its fiduciary
obligations, contravening the very essence of the trust in holding
government officials accountable to the citizenry.328 In fact, in the Oswego
Lake case, the State denied any obligation to protect public access at
all.329
Second, we also agree with the dean’s claim the public trust doctrine
is not limited to waterbodies whose beds are owned by the State.330 The
interaction of private ownership of submerged (and/or submersible) lands
and public trust property rights held by citizens over such lands should
have been made clear as long ago as the 1918 Guilliams decision, which
upheld the public’s right to use waterways overlying privately owned
streambeds.331 Dean Huffman criticized the Oswego Lake court for
creating this unnecessary linkage,332 but it was actually not a creation of
that court. Instead, it was the product of the 2005 Attorney General’s
opinion that invented the “public use” doctrine, although the court never
acknowledged it was merely affirming the Attorney General’s misguided

325 Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. 387, 435 (1892). Pa. Env’t Def. Found., 161 A.3d 911,
931−32 (Pa. 2017). See infra note 352 and accompanying text.
326 The seminal case is Lamprey, 53 N.W. 1139, 1143 (Minn. 1893), the reading of which
was adopted by the Oregon Supreme Court in Guilliams, 175 P. 437, 442 (Or. 1918).
327 The pathbreaking case was Marks, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971).
328 See supra notes 138–143 and accompanying text.
329 See supra notes 12, 66 and accompanying text.
330 Huffman, supra note 322, at 460 (disagreeing with the Oswego Lake court that the
source of the public trust doctrine is derivative of state ownership of submerged lands); id.
at 462 (comparing the public trust doctrine to an easement in which a transfer of ownership
of the servient estate does not extinguish the easement and also asserting that “sovereign
title to submerged lands beneath navigable waters was a product of the preexisting right of
public use in those waters,” which serves as a prima facie rule of original title but not necessary for the continued existence of public rights).
331 Guilliams, 175 P. at 442, reinforced by Luscher, 56 P.2d 1158, 1162 (Or. 1936).
332 Huffman, supra note 322, at 459, 463 (discussing the conflation of public interests
with public rights and the creation of a “public use” doctrine).
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opinion.333 So, we agree with Dean Huffman’s criticism, but think he
should have recognized the origin of what he viewed as a problem.334
Our criticisms of Dean Huffman’s comment begin with his failure to
mention a groundbreaking decision of the Oswego Lake opinion. He
overlooked the court’s ruling that municipalities as well as the State, are
trustees, subject to trust obligations.335 Moreover, he mischaracterized
another groundbreaking ruling that interpreted the trust to apply to
public uplands adjacent to navigable waters as a misinterpretation of
standard riparian rights law.336 In fact, the court later clarified its
decision was not intended to interpret riparian rights law.337
Another error of the dean’s comment was its singular focus on the
court’s opinion, obscuring the role other branches of state government
have played in recognizing public rights. For example, he not only failed
to recognize the 2005 Attorney General opinion was the origin of the
“public use” doctrine, he seemed to suggest the State’s claim of ownership
of water is questionable.338 This assertion ignored the longstanding
declaration by the State, dating to the 1909 Water Code, that “[a]ll water
within the state from all sources of water supply belongs to the public.”339
Public ownership of resources evokes public rights. The Oswego Lake
court recognized the public ownership of water, no less than the State’s
ownership of wildlife, implicated the public trust doctrine.340 Even the
333 2005 AG Opinion, supra note 102, at 16−28. The 2005 opinion is examined in some
detail in Michael C. Blumm & Erica A. Doot, Oregon’s Public Trust Doctrine: Public Rights
in Waters, Wildlife, and Beaches, 42 ENV’T L. 375, 382−86 (2012). The State’s interest in
creating an entirely novel doctrine was an effort to eliminate its fiduciary obligations for
waterways whose beds were privately owned. See supra notes 328−329. See also supra notes
128−36 and accompanying text.
334 Also confusing was Dean Huffman’s statement that in the wake of the Supreme
Court’s opinion, the public will have a right of access to Oswego Lake if the lake is “navigable-in-fact at the time of statehood.” Huffman, supra note 322, at 472. This assertion conflated the term “navigable-in-fact” with the test for navigability under the federal rule for
title, a distinction central to the Oregon Supreme Court’s decision. See supra note 131 and
accompanying text. Oswego Lake is clearly “navigable-in-fact” under state law, giving the
public a right to swim and boat on the lake if there is public access to the lake under
Guilliams and similar cases, as explained in the 2005 Attorney General’s opinion. See 2005
AG Opinion, supra note 102, at 24 (explaining that “navigable-in-fact” waters are those suitable for recreational watercraft). According to the Oswego Lake court, the public trust right
of access across public uplands is a function of whether Oswego Lake was navigable under
the federal title test at or around the time of statehood. Kramer II, 446 P.3d 1, 12 (Or. 2019).
335 Kramer II, 446 P.3d at 19.
336 Huffman, supra note 322, at 475−76.
337 Kramer III, 455 P.3d 922, 924 (Or. 2019) (“Because ownership of the riparian rights
remains a circumstance in dispute, it would be premature for us to resolve whether that
circumstance has relevance to plaintiffs’ claim for relief.”).
338 Huffman, supra note 322, at 474.
339 The 1909 Water Code, Act of Feb. 24, 1909, Or. L. ch. 221, p. 370 § 1 (1909), codified
in, OR. REV. STAT. § 537.110 (2019).
340 Kramer II, 446 P.3d at 12 n.12. Dean Huffman suggested the public trust in wildlife,
recognized by the Supreme Court in Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896), was reversed
in Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 326 (1979). Huffman, supra note 322, at 464. While
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State has acknowledged public ownership of water is in trust.341 Dean
Huffman’s questioning of public ownership of water was clearly
inconsistent with state law.
Perhaps our chief criticism of Huffman’s comment is his
unwillingness to acknowledge the law can and should evolve. His
commitment to judicial activism in the name of the Takings Clause may
explain his deep skepticism of doctrines which could threaten a
vitalization of compensation requirements due to regulations.342 Still,
Dean Huffman did not object to the evolution of the public trust doctrine
from tidal waters to inland waters in the nineteenth century.343
Nevertheless, he found the evolution of the public trust to protect
recreation and ecological uses objectionable. In discussing Sax’s articles,
he even suggested any judicial influence the articles had would be
inconsistent with stare decisis, “unsupported by the common law and
therefore beyond the authority of the courts.”344 Dean Huffman never
explained why the evolution of public rights in the nineteenth century
comports with his view of the public trust but not its evolution in the
twentieth century. He did not even seem to recognize that the common

Hughes did reverse Geer on whether state ownership of wildlife could insulate a state from
the scrutiny under the Commerce Clause (or other federal prerogatives), the decision has
not prevented at least 48 states from claiming the existence of a wildlife trust under state
law. See Michael C. Blumm & Aurora Paulsen, The Public Trust in Wildlife, UTAH L. REV.
1437, 1462–65 n.204 (2013). As Justice Brennan wrote in his opinion for the Court in
Hughes:
The whole [state] ownership theory, in fact, is now generally regarded as but a fiction
expressive in legal shorthand of the importance to its people that a State have power
to preserve and regulate the exploitation of an important resource. And there is no
necessary conflict between that vital policy consideration and the constitutional command that the State exercise that power . . . so as not to discriminate without reason
against citizens of other States.
Hughes, 441 U.S. at 334.
341 The State acknowledged in Chernaik v. Brown, 436 P.3d 26, 32 (Or. Ct. App. 2019)
that “title navigable” waterways themselves—not just riverbeds and lakebeds—are trust
resources, although the Court of Appeals refused to address the legal grounds for this concession.
342 The public trust doctrine is perhaps the quintessential background principle of property law that insulates regulations from compensation requirements. See Michael C. Blumm
& Rachel Wolfard, Revisiting Background Principles in Takings Litigation, 71 FLA. L. REV.
1165, 1183−1204 (2019) (reviewing recent background principles decisions including those
based on the public trust doctrine).
343 Huffman, supra note 322, at 461 (“The navigable rivers and lakes of the vast North
American continent made the modification [the extension of public rights to inland navigable waters] necessary if the doctrine was to serve the purposes it had in England where
navigable waters are almost always tidal waters.”).
344 Id. at 463.
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law values both stability and evolution, not just the former.345 As the
Oregon Supreme Court once declared:
The very essence of the common law is flexibility and adaptability. It does
not consist of fixed rules but it is the best product of human reason applied
to the premises of the ordinary and extraordinary conditions of life. . . . If
the common law should become so crystallized . . . it would cease to be the
common law of history, and would be an inelastic and arbitrary code. . . .
[O]ne of the established principles of the common law . . . [is] that precedents
must yield to the reason of different or modified conditions.346

Dean Huffman also objected to the use of private trust law principles
to influence public trust interpretation because he thinks the fact the
public is both the settlor of the trust and the class beneficiary makes
private trust law inapposite in the public trust world.347 Why public trust
jurisprudence cannot draw upon private trust law without mirroring it
precisely, he never explained.348 Instead, he posited that “[t]he trust
language of public trust law is better understood as an expression of the
confidence necessarily placed in democratic governance,” and “there are
no judicial remedies for breach of this public trust,” suggesting without
citation to authority the only remedies lie in “lobbying, recall, or the next
election.”349 This rather astonishing conclusion is precisely the opposite
function the public trust doctrine serves, which is to question and cabin
democratic decision-making in much the same way as the Bill of Rights
functions. As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court expressed, the public
trust—implicit in that state’s constitution’s declaration of rights—limits,
not reinforces, police powers by affirming the public’s “inherent and
indefeasible rights” predate the constitution itself and are embedded in
the social compact between the citizens and their government.350 In short,
345 Dean Huffman cited Justice Scalia’s dissent from denial of certiorari in Stevens v. City
of Cannon Beach, 510 U.S. 1207 (1994), as if it were law. Huffman, supra note 322, at
465−66.
346 In re Hood River, 227 P. 1065, 1086–87 (Or. 1924).
347 Huffman, supra note 322, at 468.
348 Courts regularly look to private trust standards in judging public fiduciary performance. See, e.g., Pa. Env’t Def. Found., 161 A.3d 911, 932 (Pa. 2017) (citing Restatement
(Second) of Trusts § 174 in defining the state’s duties as trustee of the people’s environmental trust to include the duty of care, skill, prudence, loyalty, and impartiality). John Dernbach suggested that public trust jurisprudence should look to conservation trust law as well
as private trust law. John C. Dernbach, The Role of Trust Law Principles in Defining Public
Trust Duties for Natural Resources, 54 U. MICH. J.L. REF. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript
at 16–17), https://perma.cc/2QZL-4WMS.
349 Huffman, supra note 322, at 468, 475. See also id. at 474 (“The reference to a trust
responsibility must be read in that political context.”); id. at 475 (“[T]he concept of trust is
political, not legal.”).
350 Pa. Env’t Def. Found., 161 A.3d at 930−31 (quoting PA. CONST. art. I, § 1) (adopting
analysis of Robinson Township v. Pennsylvania, 83 A.3d 901, 948 (2013)). See also id. at 931
(describing such rights as “of such ‘general, great and essential’ quality as to be ensconced
as ‘inviolate.’” (quoting PA CONST. art. I, § 25)). Although the Pennsylvania Constitution
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public trust rights are inherent in the social contract; legislative acts
cannot rescind these rights.351
There are some other errors in Dean Huffman’s comment. He twice
claimed the State has never claimed ownership of the submerged lands of
Oswego Lake.352 In truth, the State asserts ownership of at least the lake
as meandered in 1852.353 He also alleged the public retains no rights in
submerged lands once conveyed to private parties.354 His assertion
ignored the rights recognized in cases like Gulliams, which include the
public right to engage in “sailing, rowing, fishing, fowling, bathing,
skating, taking water for domestic, agricultural, and even city purposes
. . . and other public purposes which cannot now be enumerated or even
anticipated.”355 Surely Guilliams and its progeny intended to include
some rights to use the privately owned subsurface without trespass.356 It
contains a specific public trust provision (PA CONST. art. I, § 27), the Robinson Township
and subsequent Pennsylvania Environmental Defense Foundation opinions make clear that
article 27 created no new rights, but instead enumerated pre-existing rights that the people
had reserved to themselves in creating the state government. See id. Notably, article I, section I of the Oregon Constitution secures the same reserved rights of citizens, through its
reservation of “natural rights inherent in people.” OR. CONST. art. I, § 1. OR. CONST. art. I,
§ 1 provides: “Natural rights inherent in people. We declare that all men, when they form a
social compact are equal in right: that all power is inherent in the people, and all free governments are founded on their authority . . . .” (emphasis added). The landmark Illinois
Central opinion articulated the constitutional force of the public trust doctrine declaring,
“[t]he state can no more abdicate its trust over property in which the whole people are interested . . . than it can abdicate its police powers in the administration of government.” Ill.
Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892). As one federal district court observed, “The trust
is of such a nature that it can be held only by the sovereign, and can only be destroyed by
the destruction of the sovereign.” United States v. 1.58 Acres of Land, 523 F. Supp. 120, 124
(D. Mass. 1981). For commentary on the constitutional underpinnings and force of the public
trust principle, see Gerald Torres & Nathan Bellinger, The Public Trust: The Law’s DNA, 4
WAKE FOREST J.L. POL’Y 281, 285 (2014).
351 See Lake Mich. Fed’n v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 742 F. Supp. 441, 446 (N.D. Ill.
1990) (“The very purpose of the public trust doctrine is to police the legislature’s disposition
of public lands. If courts were to rubber stamp legislative decisions, as Loyola advocates, the
doctrine would have no teeth.”) Reserved public property rights to crucial resources remain
fundamental to the democratic understandings that underly all government authority. Id.
at 444. As the U.S. Supreme Court said in Illinois Central, private monopolization of essential resources “would be a grievance which never could be long borne by a free people.” 146
U.S. at 454, 456.
352 Huffman, supra note 322, at 469−70.
353 Kramer II, 446 P.3d 1, 14 (Or. 2019) (“[R]egardless of whether the state could dispose
of the lands underlying Oswego Lake, the state has not disposed of its interest in those
lands.”). See also Kramer v. City of Lake Oswego, No. 3:12-cv-00927-HA, 2012 WL 4863214,
at *1, *4 (D. Or. Oct. 11, 2012) (dismissing the federal suit because the State’s interest in
the bed of Oswego Lake made it a required party under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
Rule 19(a)); supra note 60 and accompanying text (citing OR. REV. STAT. § 274.430(1)
(2019)).
354 Huffman, supra note 322, at 471.
355 Guilliams, 175 P. 437, 442 (Or. 1918).
356 Id. (“To hand over all these lakes to private ownership, under any old or narrow test
of navigability, would be a great wrong upon the public for all time, the extent of which
cannot, perhaps, be now even anticipated.”). See also Luscher, 56 P.2d 1158, 1162 (Or. 1936)
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is surprising that Dean Huffman would fail to recognize public rights
beyond navigation and fishing, since his home state of Montana
recognizes both rights of access from uplands and portage rights on
private uplands.357
Dean Huffman’s comment concluded with his assertion that the
Oswego Lake decision blurred “the distinction between the state’s police
power and public rights,” encouraging “even more political factions to
pursue their interests in the courts.”358 We do not quite know what he
meant, but he did claim the plaintiffs’ motivations were larger than public
access to the lake, which, if recognized, “will be precedent for pursuit of
similar claims in other state waters previously understood to be privately
held.”359 What those private waters are, and who recognized them, are
left unsaid. The dean also raised the specter of future cases finding a right
of public access over private lands.360 In truth, there is precedent for
public access rights in private lands, although the Oswego Lake decision
cautioned such rights must be narrowly interpreted.361 But the Oswego
Lake case was about public access rights to a publicly owned lake over
publicly owned parklands. Imagining the case was about facts not in
evidence does not serve to clarify the muddy waters Dean Huffman
claimed the Oswego Lake decision created.

(“Regardless of the ownership of the bed, the public has the paramount right to the use of
the waters of the lake for the purpose of transportation and commerce.”). Commerce should
be construed broadly to include pleasure-seeking passenger crafts—recreational watercraft— because Oregon courts consider recreational vessels to be engaged in commerce. Id.
357 Pub. Land Access Ass’n v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Madison Cty., 321 P.3d 38, 50 (Mont.
2014) (denying a private landowner the right to impede the public from accessing a privately
owned riverbed); Galt v. State, 731 P.2d 912, 915−16 (Mont. 1987) (noting, however, that
public portage rights must be narrowly construed).
358 Huffman, supra note 322, at 476.
359 Id. at 477.
360 Id. (claiming that such a result would be “a big win for the plaintiffs’ supporters and
huge loss for private property rights”; also maintaining that the plaintiffs’ reliance on the
public trust doctrine for access “suggests they have bigger fish to fry” than just access). Dean
Huffman suggested that issue of public access to Oswego Lake could have been resolved in
a more straightforward manner under riparian rights law, which will in fact be an issue on
remand. Id. See also Kramer II, 446 P.3d 1, 6 (Or. 2019). How straightforward that inquiry
will be is hardly clear, however, involving questions about the extent and effectiveness of
alleged reservations of private riparian rights in the adjacent public parklands and whether
such private proprietary conveyances can eliminate sovereign rights held in trust for the
public.
361 Id. at 10−11 (interpreting Weise, 3 Or. 445, 446−47, 450−51 (1869) (recognizing the
right of a log driver to attach a boom to a privately owned land on an island in the Tualatin
River to facilitate the log drive)).
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Appendix B—A Proposal for an Office of Legal Guardian for Future
Generations
In 2012, a study group of the Oregon State Bar’s Sustainable Futures
Section proposed the following as an administrative rule or an executive
order. Neither the bar nor the state has taken any action on the proposal.
Office of Legal Guardian for Future Generations
[DRAFT 6-26-12, to be created by Administrative Rule or Executive Order]
1. CREATION OF OFFICE OF LEGAL GUARDIAN
1.1 OFFICE. There is created an Office of Legal Guardian for Future
Generations (the “Office”) within the Department of Administrative
Services.
1.2 LEGAL GUARDIAN. The Office shall be comprised of a Legal
Guardian (the “Legal Guardian”) appointed by the Governor. The Legal
Guardian shall have the following qualifications:
(a) A background in ecology and of the dependence of living beings on
healthy, functioning ecological systems, an understanding of
sustainability, and familiarity with the precautionary principle and
decision-making in the face of scientific uncertainty;
(b) A background in financial and budgetary matters and role of
economics in public policy;
(c) An understanding of the State’s governmental structure, political
system and finances;
(d) An understanding of the needs and interests of future generations
and how governmental action and public policy can impact such needs
and interests; and
(e) The general absence of any ownership interest or membership in
any business, industry or occupation or any personal relationship that
would be reasonably likely to (i) affect or create the appearance of
affecting the exercise of independent judgment relating to actions or
decisions in an official capacity, (ii) influence or create the appearance of
influencing the outcome of actions or decisions in an official capacity or
(iii) generate a private pecuniary benefit or detriment for the Legal
Guardian or his or her relative arising from actions or decisions in an
official capacity.
2. PURPOSE
The Office is created to fulfill the responsibility of the State to serve
as a trustee of the environment to ensure that a clean, healthful,
ecologically balanced, and sustainable environment is passed on to future
generations.
3. POWERS AND DUTIES OF LEGAL GUARDIAN
3.1 DEFINITIONS. The following definitions shall apply to Sections 1
to 4:
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(a) “Ecological health and sustainability of the environment” is the
capacity for self-renewal and self-maintenance of the soils, water, air[,]
people, plants, animals and other species that collectively comprise the
environment.
(b) The “environment” is the totality within the State of physical
substances, conditions and processes (including all living organisms in
the biotic community, air, water, land, natural resources and climate)
that affect the ability of all life forms to grow, survive and reproduce. The
“environment” includes both natural and human-created substances,
conditions and processes.
(c) “Future generations” means all people descended from the current
generation.
(d) “Future Generations Impact Statement” has the meaning set
forth in Section 4.1.
(e) “Inventory of Significant State Resources” has the meaning set
forth in Section 3.2(a).
(f) “Legal Guardian Response” has the meaning set forth in Section
4.3.
(g) “Ombudsperson” means a person appointed by an agency of the
State to protect the interests of future generations with respect to actions
or decisions of such agency.
(h) “Response to Impact Findings” has the meaning set forth in
Section 4.2.
(i) “State” means the State of Oregon.
3.2 FUNCTIONS. The Legal Guardian shall:
(a) Prepare an inventory (the “Inventory of Significant State
Resources”) that identifies all resources of significant ecological or
cultural importance located in the State, whether owned by the State, the
Federal government, Native American tribes, private parties or
otherwise, within one year of the date of this [Administrative Rule or
Executive Order] and thereafter update the Inventory of Significant State
Resources not less frequently than every five years, identifying additional
resources and any change in the status or condition of previously
identified resources;
(b) Identify and assess all material threats presented by decisions
and actions of the State, including all executive agencies, to the ecological
health and sustainability of the environment for future generations,
including, without limitation, material threats to the resources on the
Inventory of Significant State Resources;
(c) Evaluate alternatives to all governmental decisions and actions of
the State, including all executive agencies, that may present a material
threat to the ecological health and sustainability of the environment for
future generations and identify those that provide the least threat and
those that improve the ecological health and sustainability of the
environment for future generations;
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(d) Propose goals and actions that can be taken by the State,
including all executive agencies, that to the extent allowed by law will
best protect and improve the ecological health and sustainability of the
environment for future generations;
(e) Review, in the exercise of the Legal Guardian’s discretion or at
the request of a legislator, proposed legislation in the State to identify
and assess all material threats to the ecological health and sustainability
of the environment for future generations;
(f) Review, in the exercise of the Legal Guardian’s discretion,
proposed administrative rules in the State to identify and assess all
material threats to the ecological health and sustainability of the
environment for future generations;
(g) Issue a Future Generations Impact Statement for any proposed
legislation or proposed administrative rule in the State that the Legal
Guardian reviews and believes may or could pose a material threat to the
ecological health and sustainability of the environment for future
generations in accordance with Section 4.1;
(h) Whether or not a Future Generations Impact Statement is issued,
evaluate alternatives to proposed legislation and proposed administrative
rules that may present a material threat to the ecological health and
sustainability of the environment for future generations and identify
those alternatives that provide the least threat and those alternatives
that improve the ecological health and sustainability of the environment
for future generations and disclose such matters to the Legislative
Assembly (or committees or members thereof) or to agencies, as the Legal
Guardian determines is appropriate;
(i) Issue a Legal Guardian Response, as the Legal Guardian
determines is appropriate, in accordance with Section 4.3;
(j) Act, in the Legal Guardian’s discretion and upon such terms and
conditions as the Legal Guardian deems appropriate, in the capacity of a
mediator or arbitrator in any dispute that involves a material threat to
the ecological health and sustainability of the environment for future
generations, but only if all necessary parties to the resolution of such
dispute request in writing that the Legal Guardian act in the capacity of
a mediator or arbitrator.
(k) Consult with the State, the Legislative Assembly (or committees
or members thereof), agencies, Ombudspersons or any other person on
any matters relating to the Legal Guardian’s functions and furnish such
assistance in the performance of the Legal Guardian’s functions as may
be reasonably requested;
(l) Testify in legislative, administrative, judicial, or other hearings
that relate to the Legal Guardian’s functions, as the Legal Guardian
determines is appropriate, or intervene in any judicial proceeding that
relates to the Legal Guardian’s functions, as the Legal Guardian
determines is appropriate;
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(m) Serve in pending litigation, at the request of a state or federal
judge in Oregon, as: a special master, expert witness, or settlement judge.
(n) Ensure, together with Ombudspersons, that to the extent allowed
by law, the State, including all executive agencies, carries out the
proposed actions and achieves the proposed goals identified by the Legal
Guardian for best protecting and improving the ecological health and
sustainability of the environment for future generations;
(o) Enter into contracts to carry out the functions of the Legal
Guardian;
(p) Seek appropriate legal relief to enforce the power and authority
of the Legal Guardian; and
(q) Maintain a website for the purposes of educating the public
regarding the Legal Guardian’s responsibilities and actions, and
publishing the Inventory of Significant State Resources, the Annual
Report and all Future Generations Impact Statements.
[Sections 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5 provide for professional staff, funding, and
annual reporting.]
3.6 NO PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION. The creation of Office of Legal
Guardian, and the Legal Guardian’s powers and duties are not intended
to create any private right of action, and nothing herein shall be
interpreted to imply any private right of action.
4. FUTURE GENERATIONS IMPACT STATEMENT
4.1 PREPARATION OF FUTURE GENERATIONS IMPACT STATEMENT.
In the exercise of the Legal Guardian’s discretion or at the request of a
legislator, the Legal Guardian shall prepare a Future Generations Impact
Statement, containing such information as the Legal Guardian deems
advisable consistent with this Section 4.1, on a legislative measure
reported out of a committee of the Legislative Assembly if the Legal
Guardian determines that the legislative measure poses a material threat
to the ecological health and sustainability of the environment for future
generations. In the exercise of the Legal Guardian’s discretion, the Legal
Guardian shall prepare a Future Generations Impact Statement,
containing such information as the Legal Guardian deems advisable
consistent with this Section 4.1, on a proposed administrative rule,
whether permanent or temporary, for which a notice of rulemaking
procedure is noticed if the Legal Guardian determines that the proposed
administrative rule may or could pose a material threat to the ecological
health and sustainability of the environment for future generations. The
Future Generations Impact Statement shall provide a written
explanation of how the legislative measure or proposed administrative
rule poses a material threat to the ecological health and sustainability of
the environment for future generations and, if appropriate, identify those
alternatives that provide the least threat and those alternatives that
improve the ecological health and sustainability of the environment for
future generations. The Legal Guardian shall review or withdraw the
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Future Generations Impact Statement, as the Legal Guardian
determines is appropriate, if the legislative measure or proposed
administrative rule is amended.
4.2 RESPONSE TO ISSUANCE OF FUTURE GENERATIONS IMPACT
STATEMENT. If the Legal Guardian issues a Future Generations Impact
Statement with respect to a legislative measure, the committee of the
Legislative Assembly out of which the legislative measure was reported,
within ten days (or such longer period to which the Legal Guardian
agrees) after the Future Generations Impact Statement was issued, shall
prepare a written response (a “Response to Impact Findings”) to each
finding in the Future Generations Impact Statement, which response
shall accept or deny such finding and shall provide a written explanation
of the denial of any such finding, as the committee determines is
appropriate. If the Legal Guardian issues a Future Generations Impact
Statement with respect to a proposed administrative rule, the agency
which proposed the administrative rule, within ten days (or such longer
period to which the Legal Guardian agrees) after the Future Generations
Impact Statement was issued, shall prepare a written response (a
“Response to Impact Findings”) to each finding in the Future Generations
Impact Statement, which response shall accept or deny such finding and
shall provide a written explanation of the denial of any such finding, as
the agency determines is appropriate. The Legal Guardian may extend
the time period for the preparation of the Response to Impact Findings as
the Legal Guardian determines is reasonably appropriate.
4.3 RESPONSE BY LEGAL GUARDIAN. Within ten days after a
Response to Impact Findings is issued by a committee of the Legislative
Assembly or an agency pursuant to Section 4.2, the Legal Guardian may
prepare a written response (a “Legal Guardian Response”) with respect
to each finding in the Future Generations Impact Statement that the
committee or agency has denied. The Legal Guardian Response shall
provide such written explanation as the Legal Guardian determines is
appropriate.
4.4 DISCLOSURE. If the Legal Guardian issues a Future Generations
Impact Statement with respect to a legislative measure, the Speaker of
the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate shall cause
the Future Generations Impact Statement, the Response to Impact
Findings (when issued), and the Legal Guardian Response (if and when
issued) to be set forth on any print or electronic version of the legislative
measure to which it relates. If the Legal Guardian issues a Future
Generations Impact Statement with respect to a proposed administrative
rule, the agency proposing the administrative rule shall cause the Future
Generations Impact Statement, the Response to Impact Findings (when
issued), and the Legal Guardian Response (if and when issued) to be set
forth on any print or electronic version of the proposed administrative
rule to which it relates.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3592003

2020]

OSWEGO LAKE DECISION

1291

4.5 CONSIDERATION OF LEGAL GUARDIAN’S CONCLUSIONS. If the
Legal Guardian issues a Future Generations Impact Statement with
respect to a legislative measure, the Legislative Assembly shall consider
the Future Generations Impact Statement and the Legal Guardian
Response (if and when issued) in acting on the legislative measure to
which it relates. The Legislative Assembly shall provide a written
explanation with respect to any legislative measure that is passed by the
Legislative Assembly that is inconsistent with the Future Generations
Impact Statement or the Legal Guardian Response (if and when issued)
before the legislative measure is submitted to the Governor for action,
which explanation shall be set forth on any print or electronic version of
the legislative measure to which it relates. If the Legal Guardian issues
a Future Generations Impact Statement with respect to a proposed
administrative rule, the agency shall consider the Future Generations
Impact Statement and the Legal Guardian Response (if and when issued)
in acting on the proposed administrative rule to which it relates. The
agency shall provide a written explanation with respect to any
administrative rule that is promulgated that is inconsistent with the
Future Generations Impact Statement or the Legal Guardian Response
(if and when issued) before the administrative rule becomes effective,
which explanation shall be set forth on any print or electronic version of
the administrative rule to which it relates.
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